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TSUNAMI WATCH ON THE COAST OF BOHEMIA':
THE BIA STREAMLINING REFORMS AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF EXPULSION ORDERS
Michael M. Hethmon'
INTRODUCTION
Removal is the ultimate criterion for the viability of a national system
of immigration law. All sovereign states establish rules as to who may be
admitted into the national territory, and on what terms. These rules, in
all cases, presume the ability of the sovereign state to expel persons-
primarily aliens-who are unlawfully present within the state.
Most modern states have also developed a body of law providing relief
from expulsion, typically on humanitarian or foreign policy grounds.2 In
conditions of mass immigration, the adjudication of this specialized and
normally obscure body of law takes on broad national policy
implications.
In the United States, a system of administrative Immigration Judges
(IJs), under the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)'s Executive Office for
' Michael M. Hethmon is General Counsel for the Immigration Reform Law Institute
(IRLI). From 1999-2005, he was Staff Attorney for the Federation for American
Immigration Reform (FAIR). He is a graduate of the University of Maryland School of
Law. Mr. Hethmon can be contacted at mhethmon@irli.org.
1. The title refers to the classic article on this topic by David A. Martin, Reforming
Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of Bohemia, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1247
(1990). Professor Martin uses Walter Lippmann's "coast of Bohemia" metaphor to
highlight the difficulties of aligning public policy to a "real environment [that] is altogether
too big, too complex, and too fleeting for direct acquaintance .... [A]lthough we have to
act in that environment, we have to reconstruct it on a simpler model before we can
manage with it." Id. at 1274 (quoting W. LIPPMAN, PUBLIC OPINION 16 (1980)). The
"tsunami" metaphor evokes the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR)'s
characterization of mass immigration as a catastrophic environmental phenomenon. See,
e.g., Michael M. Hethmon, Diversity, Mass Immigration, and National Security After
9/11-An Immigration Reform Movement Perspective, 66 ALB. L. REV. 387, 398-405
(2003).
2. I find the term "expulsion," which is used extensively by John Palmer in his BIA
study with Professors Stephen Yale-Loehr and Elizabeth Cronin, helpful in referring
generally to common features of exclusion, deportation, and removal proceedings. See
generally John R.B. Palmer, Stephen W. Yale-Loehr & Elizabeth Cronin, Why Are So
Many People Challenging Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal Court? An
Empirical Analysis of the Recent Surge in Petitions for Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1
(2005). The public health and immunological connotations of this term mesh well with
FAIR's longstanding concerns about the demographic and environmental effects of
modern mass immigration.
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Immigration Review (EOIR), adjudicate expulsion at the primary level.3
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) hears appeals from the
decisions of administrative IJs.
4
This Article examines the widely reported surge in appeals of BIA
decisions since the implementation between 1999 and 2002 of the so-
called "streamlining reforms," and surveys the response of the federal
circuit courts that were required to rule on constitutional challenges to
streamlining. This analysis focuses on thirteen reported cases in which
the federal circuit courts unanimously affirmed the BIA summary review
procedures.' Then, this Article takes a critical look at these reforms
within the broader substantive context of the law of relief from
expulsion.
The BIA has stated that the ultimate fairness of its streamlining
reforms must be assessed by looking at the entire immigration
proceedings process, including the full hearing before the IJ, the initial
appeal to the Board, the opportunity for reconsideration, and the
appellate jurisdiction of the federal courts.' For the BIA, the unanimous
upholding of the summary affirmance process by the courts must be
given its proper weight]
Writers representing the immigration bar and immigrant interests have
used a four-part test for assessing administrative and judicial review
procedure in expulsion cases: accuracy, efficiency, acceptability, and
consistency.8 With the recent surge in reported decisions,9 it has not been
3. Fact Sheet, Executive Office for immigration Review, BIA Restructuring and
Streamlining Procedures (Mar. 9, 2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/06/BIA
StreamliningFactSheet03O9O6.htm [hereinafter EOIR Fact Sheet].
4. Homeland Security Act (HSA) of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 471, 116 Stat. 2135,
2205 (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 291(a)), amended the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) to abolish the former Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS), effective March 2003. Responsibility for addressing asylum claims was transferred
to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) of the newly created
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). HSA § 451, 6 U.S.C. § 271 (Supp. III 2003).
However, EOIR, along with the cadre of immigration judges and the BIA, remained
under the Department of Justice (DOJ). HSA § 1101(a), 6 U.S.C. § 521(a) (Supp. III
2003).
5. See infra Part IV.
6. Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms To Improve Case
Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,885 (Aug. 26, 2002) [hereinafter Procedural
Reforms].
7. EOIR Fact Sheet, supra note 3.
8. Stanley Mailman & Stephen Yale-Loehr, Immigration Appeals Overwhelm
Federal Courts, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 27, 2004, at 3 (citing Stephen H. Legomsky, Forum Choices
for the Review of Agency Adjudication: A Study of the Immigration Process, 71 IOWA L.
REV. 1297, 1313 (1986)).
9. See Gerald Seipp & Sophie Feal, Overwhelmed Circuit Courts Lashing Out at the
BIA and Selected Immigration Judges: Is Streamlining To Blame?, 82 INTERPRETER
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hard for opponents of curtailment of opportunities for review of final
removal orders to find "war stories" in the legal literature to support
their views.'0
I argue that the BIA has generally achieved its self-defined
administrative reform objectives, but that the federal appeals courts are
now, as a consequence, facing an administrative crisis. This crisis is
partly of their own making, as the federal courts seek to protect their
own review power. However, it has partly been imposed on the courts by
Congress, in the form of a jury-rigged body of law-which I would label
the law of relief from expulsion-that does not fit into either the criminal
or civil models of adversarial procedure. This Article discusses a set of
appellate cases reviewing challenges to BIA streamlining decisions to
illustrate the argument that a majority of judicial appeals of expulsion
orders turn on statutory and evidentiary standards that are dysfunctional
in an era of mass immigration.
This is a dissident "outsider" perspective, critical of the perceived self-
interest in much legal writing on expulsion by advocates for alien
interests and to a lesser extent, the professional civil servants within
DOJ. Historically, the development of legislation concerning
administrative and judicial review in immigration matters has occurred
almost entirely among specialists within the legal profession. The public,
variously defined, has largely been excluded. Despite the important
constitutional and practical consequences such legislation entails for the
modern administrative state, these bills are rarely the subject of open
debate accessible to the average educated citizen, even after their
introduction in Congress. For example, commentators have pointed out
that the REAL ID Act provisions were typically not examined in
committee, "but were added through a floor amendment ... and then
tacked onto must-pass appropriations legislation.""
I. THE SURGE IN APPEALS OF BIA DECISIONS SINCE THE MARCH 2002
BIA REFORMS
The surge in petitions filed in the federal courts of appeal for judicial
review of BIA decisions affirming final orders of "expulsion" has been
widely noted. 2 Observers seem to be in general agreement that the
surge began in March 2002, after the BIA issued its regulations, allowing
RELEASES 2005, 2010 (Dec. 19, 2005) (citing Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828 (7th
Cir. 2005)).
10. See, e.g., id. (citing cases criticizing BIA and IJ decisions).
11. Professor Nancy Morawetz, Remarks at the New York University School of Law
Symposium: Seeking Review: Immigration Law and Federal Court Jurisdiction 2 (May 26,
2005).
12. See, e.g., Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin, supra note 2, at 3.
2006]
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the BIA to use streamlining procedures on cases including claims for
asylum and suspension of deportation claims.' 3 In 2001, appeals of BIA
decisions were reported to have constituted 3% of all federal appeals
filed. 4 In 2002, BIA appeals were reported to be 10.9% of all appeals
filed, increasing to 14.4% in 2003."5 By 2003, BIA appeals, in the twelve
federal circuit courts that hear appeals of BIA decisions, had surged to
an astonishing 87% of all administrative agency appeals.'6
In 2005, the federal courts of appeal received about five times as many
petitions for review as they did prior to 2002.'" EOIR states that the
actual appeal rate has increased from 5% to 30%.18 A study conducted
by John R.B. Palmer, Stephen W. Yale-Loehr, and Elizabeth Cronin
(BIA Study) found that the volume of BIA decisions has increased, with
"a well-documented increase in petitions for review of final orders of
removal."' 9 Both the rate at which final orders are appealed and the
actual number of cases filed in the courts of appeal each month have
surged and continue to grow. z0
Federal circuit court judges around the country publicly expressed
concern that cases rushed through the BIA administrative review process
had "not only flooded some circuits with appeals but have also caused
lives to get lost in the shuffle of streamlining., 2' The National Law
Journal reported that the Second and Ninth Circuits "are drowning in
,22immigration appeals." The Ninth Circuit, which for some time had
accounted for more than half of all immigration appeals, was reported to
have experienced a 560% increase in immigration appeals since 2001,
"from roughly 900 in 2001 to 6,000 in 2004. ",23 Immigration cases in late
2005 represented 45% of the Ninth Circuit's entire annual docket.24 The
Second Circuit "has been buried" by an astounding 1,400% increase in
appeals from 2001. 2' The situation in the Second Circuit had "grown so
13. Id. at 3, 44, 60.
14. Mailman & Yale-Loehr, supra note 8.
15. Comm. on Fed. Courts, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., The Surge of
Immigration Appeals and Its Impact on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, 60 REC. 243,
246 (2005), available at http://www.abcny.org/pdf/report/AppealSurgeReport.pdf.
16. Id. at 246 n.18.
17. Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin, supra note 2, at 4.
18. EOIR Fact Sheet, supra note 3.
19. Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin, supra note 2, at 5, 8.
20. Id. at 8.
21. Pamela A. MacLean, Judges Blast Immigration Rulings, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 24, 2005,
at S1.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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dire" that by September 2005, the court eliminated argument on asylum
appeals.
6
A. The BIA Backlog and Pressure for Reform
The immediate impetus for the BIA reforms came from the staggering
backlog of pending administrative appeals on file with the Board in 1999,
27which at that time was expected to metastasize if no action was taken.
The backlog crisis of 1999 had its origins in the Refugee Act of 1980,28
which had provoked an unprecedented and largely unforeseen rise in
asylum claims." In response, a number of streamlining reforms were
debated in the late 1980s, with one important reform, the assignment of
BIA cases to three-member panels instead of the full Board, actually
implemented in 1988.30
Growth of the backlog was further fueled by federal legislation, which
accelerated immigrant and nonimmigrant alien entries to record levels
throughout the 1990s.
31
Beginning in 1986, the pace and scope of amendments to the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) increased 32 The Immigration
Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 introduced amnesties for
certain types of illegal aliens, thereby intensifying and expanding illegal
and derivative chain migration into this country, a result which was the
opposite of what Congress had intended. 3  Expansion of the grounds for
26. Id.
27. Executive Office for Immigration Review; Board of Immigration Appeals:
Streamlining, 64 Fed. Reg. 56,135, 56,135-36 (Oct. 18, 1999) [hereinafter Streamlining]; see
also Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin, supra note 2, at 23.
28. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8,
42, and 50 U.S.C.).
29. See Martin, supra note 1, at 1250-52.
30. Executive Office for Immigration Review; Board of Immigration Appeals;
Designation of Judges, 53 Fed. Reg. 15,659, 15,659 (May 3, 1988) (codified at 8 C.F.R. §
1003.1(a)(3)).
31. Streamlining, supra note 27, at 56,136; see also DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, STUDY
CONDUCTED FOR: THE ABA COMM'N ON IMMIGR. POLICY, PRACTICE & PRO BONO,
RE: BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS: PROCEDURAL REFORMS TO IMPROVE CASE
MANAGEMENT 13-14 (2003), available at http://www.dorsey.com/files/upload/
DorseyStudyABA-8mgPDF.pdf.
32. This overhaul of the nation's immigration laws included the Immigration Reform
and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359; the Immigration Act
(IMMACT) of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978; the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214; and the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009.
33. See INA § 245A, 8 U.S.C. § 1255a (2000) (providing amnesties for aliens that
meet certain criteria). Congressional intent to enforce immigration laws strictly is
articulated in section 115 of IRCA. IRCA § 115 (stating Congress' intent "that-(1) the
2006] 1003
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expulsion of criminal aliens and the implementation of the employer
sanctions regime, while deliberate, provided additional mechanisms for
administrative and judicial review of enforcement actions.
As a consequence, the number of appealable IJ decisions and the rates
at which the decisions were appealed to the BIA rose sharply. 4 A study
conducted for the American Bar Association (ABA) reported that the
number of appeals filed annually with the BIA roughly doubled between
1992 and 2000, while the backlog of pending appeals tripled, reaching
3163,763 in 2000. Moreover, the BIA and circuit courts ruled on an
increased number of new legal issues.1
6
B. Implementation of BIA Reform by the Attorney General
Faced with an overwhelming backlog of pending administrative cases,
the BIA began in 1999 to issue regulations streamlining its quasi-judicial
review procedures.37  The 1999 streamlining regulations were
implemented in phases. 8 DOJ published a proposed rule in September
1998 that included a new provision designed to allow selected single
Board members to affirm an administrative order without an opinion
where the member found that:
[Tihe result reached in the decision under review was correct;
that any errors in the decision under review were harmless or
nonmaterial; and that
(A) The issues on appeal are squarely controlled by existing
Board or federal court precedent and do not involve the
application of precedent to a novel factual situation; or
(B) The factual and legal issues raised on appeal are not so
substantial that the case warrants the issuance of a written
opinion in the case.3 9
In the final rule issued in October 1999, the Board designated
categories of cases suitable for single-member review, expanded the
authority of single members to issue an affirmance without opinion
immigration laws of the United States should be enforced vigorously and uniformly, and
(2) in the enforcement of such laws, the Attorney General shall take due and deliberate
actions necessary to safeguard the constitutional rights, personal safety, and human dignity
of United States citizens and aliens").
34. DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, supra note 31, at app. 10.
35. Id. at 13, app. 8, app. 11 (stating that while the number of cases doubled, the
number of appeals decided did not increase proportionately with the increase in appeals,
thus resulting in a growing backlog).
36. Cf. id. at 33-35.
37. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2006).
38. See Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin, supra note 2, at 34.
39. Board of Immigration Appeals: Streamlining, 63 Fed. Reg. 49,043, 49,044 (Sept.
14, 1998) (codified at 8 C.F.R. §1003.1(e)(4)).
1004 [Vol. 55:999
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(AWO), expanded the use of summary dismissal, and took action to
401
remand cases with technical defects. In 2000, EOIR commissioned an
audit study report by the Arthur Andersen Consulting firm to evaluate
the extent to which the Pilot Project (implementing single-member
AWOs), which ended in August 2001, had "[i]ncrease[d] productivity of
fair and legally correct decisions in a program that can be sustained over
an extended period of time."'', The report described the pilot reforms as
"an unqualified success. ' '42
Citing the success of the 1999 streamlining regulation, EOIR, in
February 2002, proposed a more sweeping streamlining regulation
further expanding the number of cases referred to a single Board
member. In May 2002, the BIA eliminated the restriction of the single-
member AWO regime to specified categories of cases.44 In August 2002,
final regulations further expanding BIA reforms were issued, which
remain in force today.
Between 1998 and 2002, the BIA issued eighteen separate internal
directives designating various categories of cases as appropriate for
streamlined review. 4' The most important of the new reforms was the
designation of single-member review as the default procedure.47 Review
by three-member panels was limited to "(1) settl[ing] inconsistencies
40. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(2), (d)(3)(ii), (d)(3)(iv), (e)(4), (e)(5).
41. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF IMMIGR. REVIEW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BOARD OF
IMMIGRATION APPEALS (BIA) STREAMLINING PILOT PROJECT ASSESSMENT REPORT 1,
4-5 (2001) (evaluating the pilot project on behalf of the United States Department of
Justice).
42. Id. at 13.
43. Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case
Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 7309, 7309-10 (Feb. 19, 2002).
44. Memorandum from Lori L. Scialabba, Acting Chairman, Board of Immigration
Appeals, to Board Members, Board of Immigration Appeals (May 3, 2002), in DORSEY &
WHITNEY LLP, supra note 31, at 23 (designating the types of cases that can be affirmed
without opinion); see also Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin, supra note 2, at app. 27
(summarizing Acting Chairman Scialabba's memorandum and stating that the
streamlining reform designated "[a]ll cases involving appeals of IJ or INS decisions, so
long as the BIA had jurisdiction and so long as the cases met the regulatory requirement
for streamlining (i.e. correct result, only harmless or nonmaterial errors, and issues either
squarely controlled by existing precedent or insubstantial")).
45. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1; Procedural Reforms, supra note 6, at 54,878.
46. See, e.g., Memorandum from Paul W. Schmidt, Chairman, Board of Immigration
Appeals, to Board Members, Board of Immigration Appeals (Nov. 1, 2000) in DORSEY &
WHITNEY LLP, supra note 31, at app. 17; Memorandum from Lori L. Scialabba, Acting
Chairman, Board of Immigration Appeals, to Board Members, Board of Immigration
Appeals (May 23, 2001) (on file with Catholic University Law Review); Memorandum
from Lori L. Scialabba, Acting Chairman, Board of Immigration Appeals, to Board
Members, Board of Immigration Appeals (Apr. 10, 2001) in DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP,
supra note 31, at app. 19.
47. Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin, supra note 2, at 28.
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among IJ rulings; (2) establish[ing] precedent; (3) review[ing] a legal
error; (4) resolv[ing] a case or controversy of national import[ance]; (5)
review[ing] a clearly erroneous factual determination by an IJ; or (6)
revers[ing] the decision of an IJ in cases other than where reversal is
'plainly inconsistent' with intervening law., 48  Summary dismissal was
expanded to appeals filed in bad faith or to cause delay.49 The standard
of review of an IJ's factual findings was restricted from de novo to
"clearly erroneous."'  Regulations now state that the BIA "will not
engage in factfinding in the course of deciding appeals," but does retain
the right to "tak[e] administrative notice of commonly known facts such
as current events or the contents of official documents."51 The number of
authorized Board members was slashed from twenty-three to eleven to
improve "cohesiveness and collegiality."
C. Debate Regarding the Practical Impacts of the BIA Workload
Management Approach
The decision by EOIR to streamline the BIA administrative appeals
53procedure was driven more by managerial, rather than legal, concerns.
That approach is appropriately described as resource- or "case-
management. 5 4 A common theme in government explanations of the
BIA reforms has been that streamlining had no effect on the
jurisprudence of removal whatsoever.55
By contrast, opponents of streamlining have claimed that the BIA
reforms "simply dumped" the backlog of appeals onto a less efficient
forum, the federal circuit courts, resulting in an overall decrease in
efficiency. 6 Professor Yale-Loehr has been quoted as comparing BIA
reform to "squeezing a balloon" because, like the BIA backlog, the air in
48. Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e) (2005)).
49. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(2)(D) (2006).
50. Id. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i).
51. Id. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv).
52. Procedural Reforms, supra note 6, at 54,893-94 (discussing the advantages of a
smaller Board). The Dorsey & Whitney study pointed to comments by FAIR and former
BIA members who argued that the increase in Board members actually added to the
backlog. DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, supra note 31, at 14-15. See generally Letter from
Michael M. Hethmon, Staff Counsel, Fed'n for Am. Immigr. Reform, to Charles Adkins-
Blanch, Gen. Counsel, Executive Office for Immigr. Review (Mar. 20, 2002) (on file with
Catholic University Law Review) [hereinafter FAIR Public Comments.
53. See Procedural Reforms, supra note 6, at 54,885.
54. Id. at 54,878, 54,885.
55. Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin, supra note 2, at 5.
56. See id. at 4-5, 31.
1006 [Vol. 55:999
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the balloon "'just goes to a different part.' 57 A Heritage Foundation
analyst called it a "'transference of costs from the executive branch to the
courts.",
8
The immigration bar, however, has also suggested that the reforms
have changed substantive law to the detriment of the alien interests the
immigration bar represents. 59 Critiques of the reforms continue to be
publicized and published, notably from former BIA member Lory D.
Rosenberg.6° These critics argue "that the changes undermine the four
basic goals of any administrative process: accuracy, efficiency,
acceptability, and consistency."'" They argue that single-member panels
are more likely to make errors than three-member panels when deferring
to the IJ's factual findings. Furthermore, they contend that losing
parties will not recognize single-member AWOs as legitimate.63
Debate has also focused on conflicting explanations offered by the
government and the bar for the surge in petitions to the appellate
courts. 64 These explanations focus on "change[s] in the composition of
the pool of BIA decisions., 65  For the ABA and its allies among
immigrant interest groups, a critical factor was the increase in summary
66decisions. Since the surge in appeals came soon after the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks, many people assumed the "surge in petitions for
review was being driven by a government crackdown on undocumented
aliens., 67 Some sources suggest that the proportion of BIA decisions
rejecting IJ appeals and issuing final orders of removal greatly increased
beginning in March 2002.6 A study by the U.S. Commission on
57. Claire Cooper & Emily Bazar, Immigration Appeals Swamp Federal Courts,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 5, 2004, at Al, available at http://www.sacbee.com/content/
newslcourts-legalstoryllO637877p-11556573c.html.
58. Id. (quoting Paul Rosenzweig, Senior Fellow, Heritage Foundation).
59. See ABA COMM'N ON IMMIGR. POLICY, PRACTICE & PRO BONO, SEEKING
MEANINGFUL REVIEW: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN RESPONSE TO DORSEY
& WHITNEY STUDY OF BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS PROCEDURAL REFORMS 1-2
(2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/immigration/bia.pdf.
60. See Lory Diana Rosenberg, Lacking Appeal: Mandatory Affirmance by the BIA, 9
BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 91, 91 (2004).
61. Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin, supra note 2, at 29-30.
62. Id. at 30.
63. Id. at 31.
64. Id. at 5.
65. Id. at 7.
66. Id. at 54.
67. Id. at 3.
68. Id. at 4.
2006]
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International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) pointed to rejection rates in
the high ninetieth percentiles.69
D. Error Rates
If poor quality BIA decisions were the result of the streamlining
reforms, it would follow, as various critics have written, that producing
more opinions in less time would "'only result in passing the buck to
others with less expertise,"' in particular, "'the already overburdened
court[]." ''7 Critics suggest that "the Board's abdication of quality review
in the interests of expeditious decision making, is now exposing certain
IJ's to probing review by Article III Judges."'" The commentary has
72focused on anecdotal horror stories.
The government has vigorously objected to the argument that the BIA
reforms resulted in a higher rate of appeal because the reforms increased
errors and inconsistency and undermined litigants' confidence in the
BIA.7' EOIR has taken the position that "there is no evidence that the
Federal [sic] court's reversal/remand rates of BIA decisions have
changed significantly since the [BIA reforms] were instituted. 7 4 The
EOIR stated that "[t]he vast majority of BIA decisions-more than 90
percent -continue to be affirmed in federal court."75 From the agency's
perspective, the 2002 BIA reform regulations limited "the Board's scope
of review of [f]acts determined by the immigration judge, including
findings as to the credibility of testimony," to the clearly erroneous
standard, the same standard used for appellate court review of findings
of fact by a trial court.76 This standard recognized the primary role of the
IJ as the fact-finder and eliminated duplication of resources created by
17
successive de novo review.
69. Id. at 56 (explaining that a USCIRF study "shows a substantial increase in the
proportion of BIA decisions that reject aliens' appeals: from 87% in fiscal year 2001, to
98% in fiscal year 2002, 97% in fiscal year 2003, and 96% in fiscal year 2004").
70. Id. at 32 (quoting Maurice A. Roberts, The Board of Immigration Appeals: A
Critical Approach, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 29 (1977).
71. See Seipp & Feal, supra note 9, at 2012.
72. See id. at 2007-12 (discussing cases).
73. E-mail from Larry Levine, Counsel for Legislative Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, to Stuart Drown, City Editor, Sacramento Bee (Sept. 21, 2004),
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/LtrtoEditorSacBee.pdf.
74. Id.
75. EOIR Fact Sheet, supra note 3.
76. John W. Guendelsberger, Judicial Deference to Agency Decisions in Removal
Proceedings in Light of INS v. Ventura, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 605, 614 (2004) (quoting 8
C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (2003).
77. Id.
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The BIA Study found that the data collected to date was too limited to
confirm a trend, but concluded that the data did not appear to document
"an increase in [the] error rate at the BIA level."78  The BIA Study
"detected no statistically significant differences between the appeal rates
of single-member decisions and three-member decisions or between the
appeal rates of [AWOs] and decisions with opinions." The authors
were also "confident" that summary dismissals under the new reforms
were being challenged at a lower rate than other BIA decisions. ° This
was "most likely due to the underlying nature of the cases," rather than
the procedure or form of the decision as a separate factor. 8' The authors
"did not detect a higher appeal rate ... for either summary decisions or
prompt decisions."' 12 In their view, the increase in final expulsion orders
and the proportion of non-detained alien appeals did not indicate a
change in the behavior of litigants, but only indicated the changed
composition of the BIA decision pool used to measure appeal rates.
8 3
E. Delay
As Professor David Martin noted in 1990, the speed or rate at which
petitions for relief from expulsion are administratively adjudicated is a
much more significant factor in immigration law than in other bodies of
administrative law. 4
EOIR asserts that aliens began to appeal BIA decisions at a higher
rate after implementation of streamlining simply to delay their
expulsion.85 The BIA Study acknowledged that perception of delay may
encourage aliens to file petitions, and thus may actually operate in a
78. Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin, supra note 2, at 59.
79. Id. at 61.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 63.
82. Id. at 6.
83. Id. at 6-7.
84. Martin, supra note 1, at 1288-89. Martin explained that:
[T]he need for expeditious finality is more intense here. In other adjudication
processes, such as those governing disability claims or public welfare or licensing,
the applicant ordinarily does not enjoy the benefit sought until there has been a
determination on the merits that he fully qualifies. Nothing in the application
and waiting process itself tempts the unqualified to clog the system. With
political asylum, in contrast, the simple act of applying has usually brought
important benefits that magnify the attractions, whatever the ultimate
determination on the merits.
Id. at 1288.
85. Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin, supra note 2, at 5; EOIR Fact Sheet, supra note 3;
Letter from Kevin D. Rooney, Executive Office of Immigr. Review, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
to John S. Carroll, Editor, L.A. Times (May 3, 2005), http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/
press/05/lettertoEditorLAT.pdf.
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"vicious cycle" to create added delay. The study cautioned that the
causation of delay that a litigant can achieve is difficult to demonstrate.
87
The authors agreed that it is possible to achieve a considerable delay in
the Second and Ninth Circuits, but argued that this is not significant
because similar delays could be achieved prior to 2002.88
F. Detention
The BIA Study also found that the detention status of the alien in
question may be an important variable. s9  Beginning in 2002, the
percentage of BIA decisions involving detained aliens dropped by more
than half (from 19-38% to 12-14%), presumably because the BIA
increased output for non-detainee cases.9° Detained aliens are less likely
to appeal because they are more likely to face jurisdictional bars due to
criminal convictions, and because filing a petition for review is likely to
prolong their detention.9'  The New York City Bar Association's
Committee on Federal Courts noted that the fact that "most of the
petitioners in the Second Circuit are not in detention" accounts for the
92lack of complaints about the reforms in that jurisdiction. The Bar
Association also suggested that the policy of the U.S. Attorney's Office
in that circuit, of routinely deferring deportation after an appeal is filed
in order to avoid litigating a motion to stay deportation, may have
actually made the new procedures even more advantageous to non-
detained appellants. 93
86. Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin, supra note 2, at 81.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 82. The difference in direct and indirect costs to aliens of different origins
from being expelled from the United States may be significant. Id. at 69-70. Aliens with
higher 'costs' are more likely to challenge BIA review. See id. at 71. An example are the
Fujianese asylum claims in the Second Circuit, where aliens are indentured by enormous
illegal debt paid in smuggling fees, but are making significantly more money than they
would in China, and face a return to an authoritarian state with weak judicial protections.
Id. at 70-71. The authors of the BIA Study note that a critical problem with delay theory
is that it is unlikely that an alien will actually be physically expelled, regardless of whether
a petition was filed. Id. at 84 n.316. Even where the risk of expulsion is very low, the
potential cost is often "enormous." Id. The difference in earning potential even over one
year makes it financially rational to file a petition. See id. Though the data is not
available, there are reasons to believe a correlation exists between case age and appeal
rate: administrative delay in older cases may reflect "aggressive litigation," or an alien
with a "genuinely difficult case." Id. at 66-68. More importantly, the longer the
administrative level delay, the more ties the alien is likely to have formed with the United
States, creating a greater incentive to invest in finding a way to stay. Id. at 68.
89. Id. at 73.
90. Id. at 74-75.
91. See id. at 75.
92. Comm. on Fed. Courts, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., supra note 15, at 255.
93. Id. at 251,255.
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Although the authors of the BIA Study stated that the significant drop
in appeals to the BIA by detainees "does not suggest that the solution to
the immigration surge is to keep more aliens in detention," they did not
provide any reasons why increased detention or a monitored release
without work authorization program would not be feasible.94
G. Change in Immigration Bar Behavior
The BIA Study identified an increase in the number of trained
immigration lawyers and the rise in the proportion of represented aliens
at the BIA level as other significant factors that may have caused the
increase in immigration cases. 95  The authors suggested that the
combination of increased BIA output, the "rush" to file facial challenges
to BIA reform regulations, and the increased BIA dissatisfaction may
have created a "'critical mass' of people within certain communities who
were all facing adverse BIA decisions at the same time," causing
immigration lawyers to begin actively litigating in the courts of appeal.
96
Data indicated that after April 2002, the appeal rate of aliens
represented by counsel was higher than the pro se appeal rate, and
appeared to be increasing. 97 The City of New York Bar Association
reported that in the Second Circuit, the BIA reforms have actually "had
a positive result: appellate review at a favored venue, the circuit courts of
appeals." 98 On the other hand, many aliens cannot afford the cost of an
appeal and must accept the decision and be deported.99
Professor David Martin suggested that the prompt execution of
expulsion orders is essential after an asylum claim is denied.'0° It is the
only form of deterrent that does not rely on "indiscriminate harshness"
toward all asylum applicants, and "[a]sylum seekers occupy a low priority
for use of scarce investigation and enforcement resources in the district
offices." 01
H. The Increased BIA Caseload
The most important reason for the surge of immigration appeals was
the increased BIA caseload. It is generally agreed that the BIA reforms
have nearly eliminated the backlog of cases for the time being.' ° One
94. Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin, supra note 2, at 74-76.
95. Id. at 85-87, 89.
96. Id. at 87-88.
97. Id. at 89-91.
98. Comm. on Fed. Courts, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., supra note 15, at 254.
99. Id. at 254 n.39.
100. Martin, supra note 1, at 1365.
101. Id. at 1365-66.
102. Guendelsberger, supra note 76, at 615.
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BIA Member has pointed out that by reducing the time delays, the BIA
reforms have also largely eliminated the need for remand to update the
record due to the passage of time.'03
Professor Yale-Loehr, one of the authors of the BIA Study, suggested
in 2004 that increased enforcement, the statutory restrictions on
discretionary relief, and expanded liability of criminal aliens for
deportation were "other factors" to consider.'4 These factors could all
be characterized as tending to increase the number of new expulsion
proceedings at the IJ level, thus producing a related increase in appeals
to the BIA.
This technical debate among government and private practitioners has
not produced any consensus on the cumulative benefits of the
streamlining reforms. Maintaining high efficiency in the process and
wide acceptability in the results may be inherently contradictory
jurisprudential objectives. The perspectives of the public and their
representatives, and of the litigants and their counsel, are conceptually
antagonistic, and in recent history, have become more so in practice.' 5
II. FAIR SUPPORT FOR BIA STREAMLINING
In public comments submitted on March 20, 2002, the Federation for
American Immigration Reform (FAIR) made one of the few
independent statements of support for the proposed reform regulation,
commenting in favor of all of the proposed changes.'06 FAIR agreed with
EOIR that only fundamental changes in the structure and procedures of
the Board would reduce the backlog of cases.'07 The public comments
pointed to strong indications that the existing system encouraged fraud
and abuse. 108
FAIR predicted that wider use of case screening procedures would
improve the summary dismissal procedures. 9 Moreover, FAIR strongly
endorsed the proposed "clearly erroneous" threshold for review of an
IJ's factual determinations as a replacement for de novo factual review. °
103. Id.
104. Mailman & Yale-Loehr, supra note 8.
105. See Marcia Coyle, Immigration Appeals Surge: A Backlog Shifts from One Level
to the Circuit Courts, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 27, 2003, at 1.
106. FAIR Public Comments, supra note 52, at 1.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 2. The clearly erroneous rule is established in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)
(2006). IJ adverse credibility decisions "supported by specific and cogent reasons," with
respect to inconsistencies and omissions in a respondent's claim, observations of the
respondent's demeanor, and reasonable inferences from those indicia, will not be
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FAIR also noted "the deterrent effect of guidance to the immigration bar
and the non-professional advocacy representatives as to what constitutes
a frivolous appeal" meriting summary dismissal."' In addition, FAIR
endorsed the shortened filing deadlines."
FAIR predicted that the rule would have "no adverse effect on the
quality of the decisions rendered." 113  FAIR noted the Andersen
Consulting audit's findings that selection for streamlining had not
increased the percentage of adverse decisions, and that the ratio of pro se
cases assigned for streamlining had not increased.' 4 FAIR opined that
remand for fact-finding would pressure the IJs to improve consistency in
their investigations. "5
FAIR vigorously attacked the immigration bar and immigrant interest
organizations for their predictions that the streamlining reforms would
"compromise . . . due process.""' 6  In particular, FAIR called the
continued comparisons by the American Immigration Lawyers
Association (AILA) of immigration procedure to criminal procedure "a
cynical demonstration of bad faith.""17 In addition, FAIR dismissed the
claims made by Professor Yale-Loehr and others "that 'Board Members
often make decisions that will determine whether someone who has been
persecuted or tortured will live or die"' as "essentially demagogic" and
"self-interest[ed].." FAIR pointed to the required priority that is given
to cases brought by detained aliens, and underlined the essential fact that
removability was almost never at issue, and thus due process claims were
arising only within the narrow context of claims by an admitted
immigration law violator for eligibility for asylum, a waiver or other
administrative relief."9 FAIR characterized applicants for relief as
"resourceful" and informed parties who had no qualms with "gaming the
system" to delay removal for months or even years.120
FAIR commented that the primary justification for the existence of the
BIA was the promotion of consistency and predictability in first-instance
adjudications through the publication of administrative precedent. ' 2 The
disturbed by the Board. In re A-S-, 21 1. & N. Dec. 1106, 1109 (B.I.A. 1998); see also
Procedural Reforms, supra note 6, at 54,889 (citing In re A-S-).
111. FAIR Public Comments, supra note 52, at 3.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 3-4.
119. Id. at 4.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 4-5.
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BIA is not an "independent court of claims for aliens." '  FAIR
predicted that reform was necessary to reduce conflicting opinions,
reduce delays needed to resolve disputes between individual members,
cut down the numbers of "'dissenting' opinions," which FAIR
characterized as "often political attacks on Congress," and reduce the
"prolixity of decisions actually issued."123
Despite FAIR's established stance as a critic of both the procedural
and substantive aspects of the law concerning relief from expulsion, the
preliminary findings of academic observers surveyed above and the
holdings of the federal appellate courts in subsequent challenges to the
BIA reforms discussed below generally confirm FAIR's predictions as to
the constitutionality and the operational feasibility of the streamlining
reforms.
III. BIA REFORMS UPHELD BY THE COURTS
Surprisingly, there has been relatively little focus in the legal literature
on the judicial review of the streamlining reforms themselves, and how
appellate review may have changed the substantive law of relief.
24
Nearly every aspect of the reforms was subjected to coordinated
challenges brought by the immigration and refugee law bars, which are
summarized in this section.1
2
1
These lawsuits were brought in the context of the vigorous attempts by
the bar during the 1990s to counter repeated actions by Congress
promoting jurisdiction-stripping as a primary tool to control illegal
immigration.126
From 1961 to 1996, the most common procedure for judicial review of
expulsion cases was through Hobbs Act petitions for review under
former INA section 106.127 Congress enacted section 106 to limit the
availability of judicial review that had been created by the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)' 28 Petitions for review were filed
directly with the courts of appeal, bypassing the district courts.'2 9
122. Id. (emphasis omitted).
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin, supra note 2, at 19-22 (outlining the
history of judicial review of immigration decisions).
125. See discussion infra Part IV.
126. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 127-41.
127. Hiroshi Motomura, Judicial Review in Immigration Cases After AADC: Lessons
from Civil Procedure, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 385, 395 (2000) (citing Act of Sept. 26, 1961,
Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 5, 75 Stat. 650,651-53).
128. Id. at 395; see also Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217, 226 (1963). But see Shaughnessy v.
Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 50-52 (1955) (holding that the 1952 Immigration and Nationality
Act allowed for full judicial review of deportation orders).
129. Motomura, supra note 127, at 395.
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According to the BIA Study, petitions filed are almost always challenged
BIA decisions.130
By enacting the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA) of 1996 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Congress sought to reform and
restrict judicial review with the goal of increasing the number of illegal
aliens removed from the United States.'3' According to the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, "[a]liens who violate U.S. immigration law
should be removed from this country as soon as possible. Exceptions
should be provided only in extraordinary cases specified in the statute
and approved by the Attorney General. 132 IIRIRA and AEDPA took
away jurisdiction from the federal courts to review removal orders for
most criminal aliens, as well as restricting their ability to review
discretionary determinations regarding removal relief. 33  Under new
INA section 242(b)(9), "[j]udicial review of all questions of law and fact,
including constitutional and statutory claims, arising out of an action to
remove an alien from the United States ... [remained] available only as
part of the judicial review of a final order of removal" in the court of
appeals.
1 3 4
AEDPA and IIRIRA sought generally to eliminate judicial review of
removal orders for aliens convicted of serious crimes. '35 The circuit
courts, with minor exceptions, upheld the AEDPA jurisdictional bars."'
IIRIRA section 306(a)(2), codified in new INA section 242, created a
single removal order review procedure for both inadmissibility and
deportability grounds, and also created a number of statutory bars to
judicial review.131
130. Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin, supra note 2, at 19.
131. See Guendelsberger, supra note 76, at 616 n.24.
132. S. REP. No. 104-249, pt. 1, at 7 (1996); see also H.R. REP. No. 104-469, pt. 1, at
139-40 (1996) (stating that "legislation is required to ensure that illegal aliens denied
asylum are actually removed from the U.S.").
133. Guendelsberger, supra note 76, at 606.
134. H.R. REP. No. 104-828, at 219-21 (1996) (Conf. Rep.); see also Castro-Cortez v.
INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir. 2001).
135. See Guendelsberger, supra note 76, at 606.
136. See LaFontant v. INS, 135 F.3d 158, 164-65 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Mansour v. INS, 123
F.3d 423, 426 (6th Cir. 1997); Mendez-Morales v. INS, 119 F.3d 738, 739 (8th Cir. 1997);
Fernandez v. INS, 113 F.3d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir. 1997); Boston-Boilers v. INS, 106 F.3d
352, 354-55 (11th Cir. 1997); Kolster v. INS, 101 F.3d 785, 791 (1st Cir. 1996); Salazar-Haro
v. INS, 95 F.3d 309, 311 (3d Cir. 1996); Hincapie-Nieto v. INS, 92 F.3d 27, 30-31 (2d Cir.
1996); Duldulao v. INS, 90 F.3d 396, 399-400 (9th Cir. 1996); Mendez-Rosas v. INS, 87
F.3d 672, 676 (5th Cir. 1996).
137. Section 306(a)(2) created bars to determinations other than asylum
determinations as well as to review of expulsion orders based on certain criminal offenses.
However, the IIRIRA permanent rule bar was successfully challenged in four circuits,
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IIRIRA restricted venue to the circuit in which the IJ completed the
proceedings.38 The deadline for filing a petition was lowered to thirty
days after the date of the final expulsion order. 39 Other amendments
made the availability and scope of judicial review depend on the date
when an order for removal, deportation, or exclusion was issued.'
40
After IIRIRA, what remained were two broad categories of
restrictions: INA section 242 limitations on circuit court review through
petitions for review, and restrictions on district or circuit court review of
specific matters in other statutes. 141
The effort by Congress to streamline or eliminate judicial review of
removal orders, especially for criminal aliens, was not completely
successful. The Supreme Court and the Article III courts refused to
accept complete congressional jurisdiction-stripping of review of BIA
which allowed criminal aliens habeas corpus review of removal orders on statutory or
constitutional grounds. See Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 232 F.3d 328, 337-38; Mahadeo v.
Reno, 226 F.3d 3, 10 (1st Cir. 2000); Flores-Miramontes v. INS, 212 F.3d 1133, 1138-41 (9th
Cir. 2000). This view was ultimately upheld by the Supreme Court in INS v. St. Cyr, 533
U.S. 289, 308-13 (2001).
138. See INA § 242(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2) (2000), amended by REAL ID Act of
2005, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(a), (b) (West Supp. 2006).
139. See INA § 242(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1).
140. See IRA J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN'S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 839 (9th
ed. 2004).
141. See Guendelsberger, supra note 76, at 615-17. There are more narrowly focused
provisions from IIRIRA that eliminated judicial review for specific actions. See INA §
236(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (2000) ("No court may set aside any action or decision by the
Attorney General under this section regarding the detention or release of any alien or the
grant, revocation, or denial of bond or parole."); INA § 242(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(2)(B) ("[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to review-(i) any judgment regarding
the granting of relief under section 1182(h) [INA section 212(h)], 1182(i) [INA section
212(i)], 1229b [INA section 240A], 1229c [INA section 240B], or 1255 [INA section 245] of
this title, or (ii) any other decision or action of the Attorney General the authority for
which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General,
other than the granting of relief under section 1158(a) [INA section 208(a)] of this title.");
INA § 242(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) ("[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to
review any final order of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having
committed a criminal offense covered in section 1182(a)(2) [INA section 212(a)(2)] or
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) [INA section 237], (B), (C), or (D) of this title, or any offense covered
by section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) of this title for which both predicate offenses are, without
regard to their date of commission, otherwise covered by section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) of this
title."); INA § 242(b)(7)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(7)(D) ("The defendant in a criminal
proceeding under section 1253(a) [INA section 243(a)] of this title may not file a petition
for review under subsection (a) of this section during the criminal proceeding."); and INA
§ 242(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) ("Except as provided in this section ... no court shall have
jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the
decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or
execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter.").
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removal orders on due process grounds. 142 In 1996, AILA succinctly
predicted that:
There will be due process constitutional litigation over the
provisions of the 1996 Immigration Reform Act as it applies to
aliens. This litigation will once again face the courts with the
classic debate over Congress' "plenary power" to make rules for
admission and exclusion of aliens and the rule that Congress
must act in accordance with the Constitution. The focus will be
particularly keen on areas such as restrictions of judicial review
and mandatory detention.
14
1
In Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee'4" and other
cases, the courts have read these preclusion statutes narrowly, and have
preserved judicial review through other means, including habeas corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1361, review of
agency action under the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., and review of
federal questions of law raising constitutional issues under 28 U.S.C. §
1331.145 The Article III courts have fiercely defended a strong legal
presumption in favor of judicial review and construction of ambiguities in
favor of aliens, particularly where constitutional claims were raised.
46
The Court's decision in INS v. St. Cyr147 allowed some issues to be
appealed by petition for review, and other issues by habeas motions in
district court.1 48 The decision "'resulted in hundreds, if not thousands, of
remands to the Board and Immigration Judges,"' and probably provoked
executive agency pressure on Congress to attempt to move all appellate
review back to the circuit courts by enacting the REAL ID Act.
49
In enacting the REAL ID Act in 2005, Congress claimed that it did not
intend to eliminate judicial review, but intended to return judicial review
to its "settled forum prior to 1996"-to the circuit courts.'50  "Unlike
AEDPA and IIRIRA, which attempted to eliminate judicial review of
criminal aliens' removal orders, [REAL ID] section 106 would give every
142. See infra text accompanying notes 145-49.
143. Howard S. (Sam) Myers, II, Where Have We Come From, Where Are We and
What's on the Horizon, in INTRODUCING THE 1996 IMMIGRATION REFORM ACT, AILA's
NEW LAW HANDBOOK 1, 9 (R. Patrick Murphy et al. eds., 1996) (footnotes omitted).
144. 525 U.S. 471 (1999).
145. See, e.g., id. at 486-87. See generally Kurzban, supra note 140, at 842-60.
146. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 700-01 (2001).
147. 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
148. Id. at 314, 326.
149. Capital Area Immigrants' Rights Coal. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 264 F. Supp. 2d
14, 17 n.2 (D.D.C. 2003) (citation omitted).
150. H.R. REP. NO. 109-72, at 174-75 (2005) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 240,299.
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alien one day in the court of appeals, satisfying constitutional
concerns."
,
'
51
This summary shows that, by the time the immigration bar chose to
mount a direct challenge to BIA streamlining reforms, Congress had
been unhappy for more than forty years with the excessive availability of
judicial review to aliens in expulsion cases.
IV. THE CIRCUIT COURTS REVIEW BIA STREAMLINING
The first counter-attack by immigrant interests against the validity of
the BIA streamlining regulations came in a suit brought in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia by the Capital Area
Immigrants' Rights Coalition (CAIR), a coalition of immigrant interest
groups, which challenged the issuance of the reform regulations under
the APA.'52 The AILA joined CAIR in arguing that the adoption of the
streamlining provision, "as the dominant method of adjudication[,]
reducing the size of the Board from 23 members to 11[,] and ... the six-
month transition period designed to reduce the Board's backlog" were
arbitrary and capricious.' 3 The district court rejected those claims,
finding that EOIR had "articulated a satisfactory explanation for the
decision to adopt streamlining" by relying on the favorable Arthur
Andersen audit, "[c]ongressional testimony reflecting a continued need
for Board reform," and internal DOJ statistics and assessments.
Between 2002 and 2004, aliens sued to bring facial challenges to AWO
in eleven federal circuit courts, based on denial of due process and
violations of administrative procedure.'55 Again, the aliens lost every
156
case.
The first case, Albathani v. INS,'57 involved the appeal by a Lebanese
Christian of the BIA's denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and
United Nations Covenant Against Torture (CAT) relief based on his
membership in a particular social group, the Lebanese Forces militia.'58
Denial was made in an IJ decision based on lack of credibility.'59 The
151. ld. at 175.
152. Capital Area Immigrants' Rights Coal., 264 F. Supp. 2d at 16.
153. Id. at 16,25.
154. Id. at 26; see also Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin, supra note 2, at 29-32.
Significantly, the decision was not appealed. See id. at 29.
155. See Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin, supra note 2, at 29 & nn. 156-57. The D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals does not hear petitions for review because there are no
immigration courts in its jurisdiction. See id. at 29 n.156.
156. Id. at 29 (citing cases).
157. 318 F.3d 365 (1st Cir. 2003).
158. Id. at 367-69.
159. Id. at 367.
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BIA summarily affirmed pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(7).' ° The appeal
to the circuit court claimed denial of due process, including the operation
of the new BIA summary AWO procedure. 161  The American
Immigration Law Foundation (AILF) submitted an amicus brief arguing
that summary AWO violated rules of administrative law.'
62
Albathani was required to provide conclusive evidence that he was the
target of persecution on any of the five grounds, providing an account
with a requisite specificity to "'establish a sufficient nexus between the
events that he described and any ground enumerated"' for relief.
6 1
Applying this test, the First Circuit found that the record adequately
supported the IJ's finding that Albathani lacked credibility.'
64
"Albathani's inconsistency problems go well beyond mere fluctuations.
He showed a pattern of embellishing his story. In each context, [he]
added a new incident.'
65
Albathani claimed a due process violation based on the IJ's sharp
demeanor during the conduct of his hearing.' 66 The court reviewed these
claims, but found them "meritless.' ' 67  Because Albathani was an
unadmitted alien, his due process rights were "limited.' ' 6 Even if he had
been admitted, the IJ's curt demeanor did not raise due process issues
because "attempts to expedite proceedings are 'not the stuff of which a
due process violation can be fashioned.' ' 1 69  As for the AWO due
process, the court emphasized that "[tlhe context of the claim is
important. An alien has no constitutional right to any administrative
appeal at all.'
' 70
The Attorney General adopted the AWO procedure in 1999, and then
proposed rules to expand its scope in February 2002.17' The court
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 373 (quoting Aguilar-Solis v. INS, 168 F.3d 565, 571 (1st Cir. 1999)). The
five grounds of persecution are "'race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group or political opinion."' Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)).
164. Id. at 373-74.
165. Id. at 374.
166. Id. at 374-75.
167. Id. at 375.
168. Id. (citing Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 230 (1925)) (finding that mere physical
presence on U.S. territory is immaterial because unadmitted aliens are "still in theory of
law at the boundary line and [have] gained no foothold in the United States").
169. Id. (quoting Aguilar-Solis v. INS, 168 F.3d 565, 569 (1st Cir. 1999)).
170. Id. at 375-76 (citing Guentchev v. INS, 77 F.3d 1036, 1037 (7th Cir. 1996)).
171. Id. at 376 & n.8.
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predicted that the outcome would be to shift the backlog to the appeals
courts.1
72
Albathani and AILF argued that summary affirmance did "not provide
a reasoned basis for review. ,173 The court rejected this view, holding that
no due process violation occurred because "[p]romulgation of the AWO
regulations is within the power of the INS.' 74 It did not matter whether
the Board itself provided a reasoned opinion or whether it merely relied
on the reasoning of the IJ, because administrative law only required the
agency under which the Board was established to do so-in this case, the
former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). 175  The court
stated, "[t]he BIA can adopt, without further explication, the IJ's
opinion.', 7 6 Because summary AWO is "only of the 'result' and not the
reasoning," an appeals court reviewing a decision might not know the
basis on which the BIA rendered its decision. 177 However, no statutory
or due process violation occurs if the court can review the IJ's decision
and the record upon which it was based.1 78 The court found that "if the
BIA identifies an alternative satisfactory ground for upholding denial" of
relief where the decision of an IJ was "unsatisfactory," it "must state it or
risk remand.'
179
The court found the argument that a one-line affirmance may mean
that Board members were not "engaged in the review required by
regulation" to be "more serious," because "[i]mmigration decisions,
especially in asylum cases, may have life or death consequences, and so
the costs of error are very high.' 180 While strongly suggesting the Board
did not really review the record before the IJ, since "the record of the
hearing itself could not be reviewed in ten minutes," the court
nonetheless concluded that such an error was harmless in this case.18'
The First Circuit declined to infer just from the BIA's rate of decisions
under the AWO procedure that "evidence of systemic violation by the
BIA of its regulations" existed, because courts themselves used such
172. Id. at 377 n.9.
173. Id. at 377.
174. Id.; see also Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 543 (1978) (noting that agencies "should be free to fashion their own rules of
procedure and to pursue methods of inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge their
multitudinous duties" (quoting FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 290 (1965))).
175. Albathani, 318 F.3d at 377 (finding that Supreme Court precedent did not
"require that this statement come from the BIA rather than the IJ").
176. Id. (citing Chen v. INS, 87 F.3d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1996)).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 377-78 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A) (2000)).
179. Id. at 378.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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procedures to manage their dockets. 82  The court found that the
procedures employed by the BIA "are workload management devices
that acknowledge the reality of high caseloads. They do not, either alone
or in combination with caseload statistics, establish that the required
review is not taking place." 83
Weeks later, in March 2003, the Fifth Circuit, writing per curiam in
Soadjede v. Ashcroft,'84 rejected a challenge-as statutorily ineligible-to
BIA streamlining in the appeal of a denial of an asylum application filed
more than one year after the alien's arrival in the United States."' The
decision did not disclose the petitioner's nationality, and noted that
Soadjede "d[id] not argue that the decision in his case [was] not
supported by substantial evidence. ' ' The court construed the appeal as
a claim that the AWO procedure violated due process."'
The Fifth Circuit had "previously joined the majority of circuits in
approving the authority of the BIA to affirm the immigration judge's
decision without giving additional reasons. 1 8  The court "agree[d] with
the reasoning set forth ... in Albathani [that] in adopting the regulation,
the Department of Justice . . .specifically considered the potential due
process concerns about summary affirmance." '189 The court quoted with
approval the DOJ's statement in the Federal Register that "'an
endorsement of the result reached by the decision-maker below satisfies
any conceivable due process requirement concerning justifications for
the decisions made in any appellate process that the government decides
to provide.""'
In April 2003, the Eleventh Circuit referred to the Albathani decision
in Mendoza v. U.S. Attorney General'9 when it denied asylum to aGuatemalan applicant who had illegally entered the United States nine
182. Id. at 378-79.
183. Id. at 379.
184. 324 F.3d 830 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
185. Id. at 831-32.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 831.
188. Id. at 832 (citing Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001);
Mikhael v. INS, 115 F.3d 299, 302 (5th Cir. 1997); Giday v. INS, 113 F.3d 230, 234 (D.C.
Cir. 1997); Chen v. INS, 87 F.3d 5, 7 (1st Cir. 1996); Prado-Gonzalez v. INS, 75 F.3d 631,
632 (11th Cir. 1996); Urukov v. INS, 55 F.3d 222, 227-28 (7th Cir. 1995); Alaelua v. INS, 45
F.3d 1379, 1382-83 (9th Cir. 1995); Maashio v. INS, 45 F.3d 1235, 1238 (8th Cir. 1995);
Gandarillas-Zambrana v. BIA, 44 F.3d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1995); Arango-Aradondo v.
INS, 13 F.3d 610, 613 (2d Cir. 1994)).
189. Id. (citing Streamlining, supra note 27, at 56,139).
190. Id. (quoting Streamlining, supra note 27, at 56,139); see also Moin v. Ashcroft, 335
F.3d 415, 418 (5th Cir. 2003).
191. 327 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2003).
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years before the case, but failed to file an asylum application until
August 1998, more than one year after his illegal entry.'9 The IJ found
"conclusory" the applicant's testimony that guerillas were persecuting his
family because of his father's prior military service, and held that the
applicant had failed to rebut evidence of changed country conditions. "'
The petitioner, Mendoza, also raised a due process objection to the
BIA's single-sentence affirmance of the IJ's decision. 194  Because
Mendoza did not challenge the discretion of the INS to streamline his
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit did not address the First Circuit's holding
that adoption of summary affirmance procedures was a decision
committed to agency discretion under the Vermont Yankee doctrine.'9
Instead, the court considered the more limited claim that the "BIA
deviated from its own regulations by failing to review the facts of his
case."' 96 Affirmance of an IJ's decision by a single BIA member in a
single sentence without an opinion was permitted by regulation if "'the
result was correct and . . . any errors were harmless or immaterial,"' and
"the issue on appeal is squarely controlled by existing ... precedent."'
97
As in Albathani, the Eleventh Circuit noted that there was "no evidence
that the BIA member who reviewed Mendoza's removal deviated from
the requirements of the regulations" in deciding to streamline his appeal,
and that the IJ's decision and the record "reveals that there is a basis for
affirmance and for summary affirmance of Mendoza's removal."' 198
In May 2003, the Seventh Circuit addressed the issue in Georgis v.
Ashcroft,'" in the context of a denial of asylum to an Ethiopian claiming
racial and political opinion persecution.2°° The BIA affirmed without
opinion the IJ's determination that the applicant's claims "were not
'internally consistent' and 'inherently persuasive." '' 20 1  Georgis had
entered and overstayed a tourist visa in 1995, but did not apply for
asylum until after a "Notice to Appear" was issued in July 1997.202
192. Id. at 1286, 1288. Since the enactment of TIRIRA in 1996, the one-year period is
calculated from April 1, 1997 or the "date of the alien's last arrival in the United States,"
whichever is later. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2006).
193. Mendoza, 327 F.3d at 1285-86.
194. Id. at 1288.
195. Id. at 1288 n.7.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1288-89 (second omission in original) (quoting Gonzalez-Oropeza v. U.S.
Att'y Gen., 321 F.3d 1331, 1332 (11th Cir. 2003)).
198. Id. at 1289; see supra note 182 and accompanying text.
199. 328 F.3d 962 (7th Cir. 2003).
200. Id. at 963-64.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 964.
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The immigration court's decision to deny the asylum application was
reviewed under the substantial evidence test. Under the substantial
evidence test, the court has noted that "[o]nly where the evidence in
support of the application is 'so compelling that no reasonable fact-finder
could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution' will we reverse the
Board's decision for lack of evidence. '' 204 Review of the IJ's credibility
determination was "highly deferential," except where conclusions were
"drawn from insufficient or incomplete evidence."20 5 In this case, the
court found its own explanation for four of the six inconsistencies
resulting from the applicant's testimony cited by the IJ, and disparaged
the remaining two inconsistencies in testimony identified by the IJ as
insufficient to constitute substantial evidence of a lack of credibility.0 6
The court found Georgis' explanations "plausible," but deferred to the
role of the IJ as fact-finder, and remanded the case to the BIA for
review.' °
Like the First and Eleventh Circuits, the court in Georgis declined to
rule on whether the agency's authority to implement streamlining was
reviewable under the APA, as "it makes no practical difference whether
the BIA properly or improperly streamlined review of Georgis' case., 28
If the case came to the circuit court on a petition for review, the
substance of the review would have been the same in either scenario.2°9
The decision noted that in Albathani, the First Circuit "held that the
streamlining procedure on its face neither violates due process, renders
judicial review impossible, nor runs afoul of any statute."21  Direct
review of the IJ's decision in cases appealed from the BIA under 8
C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(7) did not compromise the courts' "ability to conduct
a full and fair appraisal of the petitioner's case. 2 .'
The influential Ninth Circuit also adopted the reasoning of the
Albathani decision in Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft,12 a November 2003
decision dismissing the appeal by a Mexican family of denial of its
213
application for cancellation of removal .
203. Id. at 967 (citing Ambati v. Reno, 233 F.3d 1054, 1059 (7th Cir. 2000)).
204. Id. at 967-68 (quoting INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 484 (1992)).
205. Id. at 968 (citing Nasir v. INS, 122 F.3d 484, 486 (7th Cir. 1997)).
206. Id. at 968-70.
207. Id. at 970.
208. Id. at 967.
209. Id. (citing ICC v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. 270, 279 (1987)).
210. Id. (citing Albathani v. INS, 318 F.3d 365, 377 (1st Cir. 2003)).
211. Id.
212. 350 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2003).
213. Id. at 848-50.
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The Carriche family appealed a BIA summary AWO denying their
request for cancellation of removal . 4 The IJ found that the hardship
their youngest daughter, a U.S. citizen, would suffer if the family were
removed -"difficulty adapting to the Mexican educational system and..
. economic conditions in Mexico, [and that] the family would be hard-
pressed to provide for her basic care"-was "neither exceptional nor
unusual." '15 Supported by amicus AILF, the Carriches claimed that "the
discretionary nature of the hardship inquiry preclude[d] streamlining in
cancellation of removal cases."2"6  Citing all four precedents from its
sister circuits, the court held that "streamlining does not violate an alien's
due process rights" and that the appeals court "lack[ed] jurisdiction to
review the specific decision to streamline," because the claim was "based
on an alleged error in a discretionary hardship determination that [it]
lack[ed] jurisdiction to review in the first instance." '217
"A dramatic increase in caseload," coupled with "'frequent and
significant changes in the complex immigration laws,"' prompted the
BIA to implement streamlining procedures in 1999.2"' The procedure
was designed "to meet four goals: (1) to promote uniformity by providing
better quality BIA decisions in the cases that three-member panels
decide; (2) to improve timeliness and fairness of decisions; (3) to assure
correct results; and, (4) to eliminate the BIA's backlog., 21 9 The court
also predicted that "the practical result may be to shift the backlog
directly to the courts of appeal.,
2 0
The Ninth Circuit found that Albathani's "careful reasoning is
persuasive., 22' The requirement that the court review a BIA AWO
decision "'without knowing its basis' does 'not render the scheme a
violation of due process or render judicial review impossible.' ' 222 The
appellant's arguments that "'it takes at least three board members to
identify, shape and determine important issues' in every appeal" or that
"a single board member will not conduct the required review" were held
to have "no support in the law., 223 The argument made in the Mendoza
214. Id. at 848.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 847-48, 850 n.4.
217. Id. at 848-49.
218. Id. at 849 (quoting Streamlining, supra note 27, at 56,136).
219. Id. at 849 n.3 (citing Streamlining, supra note 27, at 56,136).
220. Id. (citing Albathani v. INS, 318 F.3d 365, 377 n.9 (1st Cir. 2003)).
221. Id. at 850.
222. Id. (quoting Albathani, 318 F.3d at 377).
223. Id. at 850.
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case that the BIA was not complying with its own regulations was not
raised by the Carriches2
The petitioners "received all of the administrative appeals to which
they were entitled by statute, and the Constitution does not require that
the BIA do more., 225 The Ninth Circuit expressly acknowledged the
Vermont Yankee doctrine of deference to agency discretion in fashioning
its own rules and methods of procedure.226 Where jurisdiction exists, the
court could still review the agency decision as embodied in the IJ's
decision.27 BIA streamlining was "similar to the BIA's already-familiar
practice of adopting the IJ's opinion without issuing a separate opinion
where the IJ's reasoning is sufficient.,
228
The Ninth Circuit also found no due process violations, using the
Mathews v. Eldridge three-part test. 29 Although the alien petitioners had
"a substantial interest in remaining in the United States," the balancing
test's other two factors "favor[ed] the government., 230 There was no
"substantial risk of erroneous deprivation" of due process, nor were
additional safeguards required, because the alleged risks were "mitigated
through the regulatory structure itself., 23' Finally, the court held that
"the streamlining regulations have proven effective at reducing the BIA's
backlog and the cost of administrative appeals," and thus furthered the
government's goals.,
232
The court also rejected the argument that hardship claims are
inherently so fact-oriented that each case is necessarily novel, making
summary adjudication "arbitrary and a denial of due process." '233 The
court explained that "'legally significant facts often fall into recognizable
patterns' [and] [i]t is neither arbitrary nor a violation of due process for
the BIA to decide that a particular case clearly falls within, or outside,
234
those boundaries" of the hardship standard.
Next, the court discussed at length the claim that every decision to
deny a cancellation of removal (COR) hardship claim on the merits
involves an assessment of a "'novel fact situation,'.., a non-discretionary
224. Id. at 850 n.5.
225. Id. at 850 (internal citations omitted).
226. Id. (citing Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 543 (1978)).
227. Id. at 851 (citing Georgis v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 962, 967 (7th Cir. 2003)).
228. Id.
229. Id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 851-52.
233. ld. at 852.
234. Id. (quoting Streamlining, supra note 27, at 56,140).
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factor that is reviewable." '235 The court found that it was "without
jurisdiction to review whether the BIA improperly streamlined [an]
appeal of a cancellation of removal decision in which only the
discretionary 'exceptional and extremely unusual hardship' factor was in
dispute., 1 '36  Although the decision to streamline the case was not
"inherently discretional," IIRIRA section 306 had expressly stripped
appellate court jurisdiction to review discretionary decisions in the COR
context, "including the ultimate discretionary decision to deny relief.
2 3 7
Saved from the section 306 scalpel were objective factual inquiries (e.g.,
whether the alien met the ten-year continuous presence requirement)
and questions of law (e.g., whether an adult daughter was a child for
COR purposes).3 8 However, "whether an alien has demonstrated
'exceptional and extremely unusual hardship'' was a clearly
discretionary issue, and thus protected from judicial review by statute.239
The alien's claim that COR hardship determinations could not be
streamlined because they were factually unique was dismissed as
"circular logic. ' 240
The court held that, in theory, it retained jurisdiction under the
consolidation of review provision (8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9)) to review the
BIA's decision to streamline asylum and COR cases where "the IJ's
decision is not based on a discretionary factor.2 4 ' But that exercise would
be "unnecessary and duplicative," since the petitioner's concern for not
knowing "the 'real' reasons for the BIA's decision falls by the wayside
when we review the merits of the case., 242 "[W]here we can reach the
merits of the decision by the IJ or the BIA, an additional review of the
streamlining decision itself would be superfluous.
243
The court noted that other circuits, besides the Eleventh Circuit, had
"considered streamlining regulations only in the context of asylum and
withholding of deportation petitions for which judicial review is still
permitted under IIRlRA. ' 2
235. Id.
236. Id. at 855.
237. Id. at 852-53 (quoting Romero-Torres v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 887, 890 (9th Cir.
2003)).
238. Id. at 853; see also Montero-Martinez v. Ashcroft, 227 F.3d 1137, 1144 (9th Cir.
2002) (finding that judicial review is available for legal questions); Kalaw v. INS, 133 F.3d
1147, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that judicial review is available for factual inquiries).
239. Falcon Carriche, 350 F.3d at 853.
240. Id. at 854.
241. Id. at 855 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) (2000)).
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 853 n.7.
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In Denko v. INS,245 the Sixth Circuit rejected a due process challenge to
AWO procedures in the context of a petition for review brought by a
Ukranian Jewish applicant for asylum based on religious persecution,
where the BIA summarily affirmed the IJ's denial of a motion to rescind
an order of removal issued in absentia.246 Supported by amicus AILF,
Denko argued that it was "an abuse of discretion for the IJ not to reopen
[her] removal proceedings" after she presented evidence of: ineffective
assistance of counsel; conflict between the AWO regulation (8 C.F.R.
§1003.1(a)(7)) and the statutory language of the INA; and a violation of
due process, "because [the AWO regulation] fail[ed] to produce a
separate BIA decision for the court of appeals to review. ' '14 Denko had
entered as a visitor in April 1993 and overstayed her authorization, but
did not file an asylum application until nearly five years later, in March
1998.24" The court first considered "whether it was an abuse of discretion
for the IJ to determine that Denko's claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel were insufficient to constitute an exceptional circumstance," as
required by 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C). 249  The court applied a
fundamental unfairness test to determine whether Denko was
"prevented from reasonably presenting [her] case." 250 The court found it
important to point out that Denko "neither contest[ed] the illegal nature
of her presence in the U.S. nor her deportability," and thus could not
show fundamental unfairness amounting to ineffective assistance of
counsel. T
In her AWO challenge, Denko argued that "congressional intent
embodied in the INA" showed that aliens were meant to have "two de
novo reviews of their claims within the administrative system," which the
AWO regulations had made impossible; and that without an independent
BIA opinion, the agency had failed to prepare the required final order of
removal for the court's review.252
The Sixth Circuit stated its rule of minimum due process in expulsion
cases: "aliens who have entered the United States, both lawfully and
unlawfully, cannot be 'expelled' without the government following
established procedures consistent with the requirement of due
process., 253 However, Denko's characterization of congressional intent
245. 351 F.3d 717 (6th Cir. 2003).
246. Id. at 720.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 723.
250. Id. (quoting Ramirez-Durazo v. INS, 794 F.2d 491, 499-500 (9th Cir. 1986)).
251. Id. at 724.
252. Id. at 725-26.
253. Id. at 726 (citing Shaughnessy v. U.S. ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953)).
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was rejected, on the basis that "the BIA has the power to conduct
reviews de novo, not that it is required to do so. '25 4 The court found that
it was permissible to adopt the IJ's decision as the final agency
determination where the BIA either "adopted the IJ's findings or has
deferred to the IJ's decision. 2 '55 The court agreed with the First Circuit
in Albathani that a petitioner challenging summary affirmance
regulations "must show more [than] the nature of the procedure itself
combined with statistics indicating that thorough review would be
difficult. ,
256
The Sixth Circuit referred to the Albathani line of cases to hold that no
due process violation had occurred. 257  Administrative appeal is not
constitutionally compelled. When a court could review the IJ's decision
in the absence of a BIA opinion, the AWO rule provided a "full and
258fair" review. Citing the Vermont Yankee doctrine of deference to
agencies' use of procedure, the court concluded that the Mathews v.
Eldridge three-part test for due process tilted in favor of the
government's "strong interest in its procedures for accurate, efficient,
and economical adjudication of immigration matters. 25 9
However, the Sixth Circuit declined to endorse the agency's claim that
single-member summary affirmance was excepted from APA review as
an action "committed to agency discretion by law.''260 The court found
that "judicially manageable standards [are] available to a reviewing
court," and that the size of the BIA caseload was not a factor to be
considered, since the regulations themselves preclude streamlining for
cases where the issues are not controlled by precedent and the facts are
novel.26' "Assuming without deciding that judicial review" could
determine whether a case was properly designated for AWO under the
streamlining regulations, the court concluded that it was proper under
the facts in the Denko case.2 62
The Third Circuit's review of the BIA streamlining regulations in Dia
v. Ashcroft63 in December 2003 was notable because it affirmed the
procedure but remanded the case on the merits, provoking a dissent by
254. Id. at 728 (emphasis omitted).
255. Id.
256. Id. (citing Albathani v. INS, 318 F.3d 365, 378-79 (1st Cir. 2003)).
257. See id. at 729-30.
258. Id. at 730 (quoting Huicochea-Gomez v. INS, 237 F.3d 696, 699 (6th Cir. 2001)).
259. Id. at 730-31 n.10.
260. Id. at 731 (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828 (1985)).
261. Id. at 731-32.
262. Id. at 732.
263. 353 F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc).
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Judge Samuel Alito.264 In Dia, an unadmitted Guinean asylum applicant
appealed summary affirmance of an IJ decision denying asylum after
265determining that Dia's testimony was not credible.
The Third Circuit characterized the BIA caseload in 1999 as
"crushing[,] . . . the number of cases having increased exponentially in a
little over a decade., 266 The court applied Chevron principles to analyze
the BIA's "'construction of the statute which it administers,"'
recognizing that deference to the executive branch was "'especially
appropriate in the immigration context.' 27 The INA was "'silent with
respect to' streamlined administrative appeals," but did not contain
anything that was "inconsistent" with the streamlining regulations.268 In
particular, it "would require a sizable leap that [the court could not]
make" to claim that the definition of a final "order of deportation" at 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(A)-(B) prohibits streamlining. 269 Referring to the
Vermont Yankee doctrine, the court held that "the Attorney General did
not run afoul of the INA" when he promulgated the streamlining
270
regulations.
The court also "agree[d] with [its] sister courts of appeals ... that the
streamlining regulations do not violate the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution., 271  The due process to which aliens are entitled in
deportation proceedings "stems from those statutory rights granted by
Congress and the principle that '[m]inimum due process rights attach to
statutory rights.' 27 2  Therefore, "an unadmitted alien present in the
United States has only 'limited' due process rights.,
273
When analyzing a due process argument, the court noted that, "in the
context of the adjudication of claims for relief from removal," due
process requires only that "ta]n alien: (1) is entitled to factfinding based
on a record produced before the decisionmaker and disclosed to him or
her; (2) must be allowed to make arguments on his or her own behalf;
and (3) has the right to an individualized determination of his [or her]
264. Id. at 234, 261.
265. Id. at 233-34.
266. Id. at 235.
267. Id. at 236 (quoting INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424-25 (1999)).
268. Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843 (1984)).
269. Id. at 237-38 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B) (2002)).
270. Id. at 238.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 239 (alteration in original) (quoting Marincas v. Lewis, 92 F.3d 195, 203 (3d
Cir. 1996)).
273. Id. (quoting Albathani v. INS, 318 F.3d 365, 375 (1st Cir. 2003)).
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interests. ,2 74 Rejecting Dia's claim that these requirements could not be
met by a single-member BIA summary adjudication of his asylum claim,
the court found that the individualized determination was provided by
the IJ.27' The BIA was not required by the Constitution to articulate its
276
reasons for affirmance. The court adopted the Albathani holding and
rejected an administrative law-based due process challenge argued by
amici AILF.17  Neither the "brevity" of the AWO decision, nor the
broader requirement for fundamental fairness, showed a lack of due278 "A
process. An applicant retains a full and fair opportunity to make his
case to the IJ, and has a right to review of that decision by the BIA, and
then by a court of appeals.
2 79
The court then engaged in a lengthy interpretation of the application
of the substantial evidence test, which is used in asylum credibility
determinations, to the factual record in the Dia case.2'0 After Dia was
detained at a U.S. airport while claiming to be in transit from Italy to
Honduras to work on a ship, the IJ found he was not credible, based on
"inconsistencies in Dia's testimony and its overall implausibility."
2 8
Scrutinizing the IJ's adverse credibility finding, the court identified
IIRIRA section 306 as the codification of the substantial evidence test
from INS v. Elias-Zacharias.8 2 The section 306 test is the standard for
review of agency fact-finding, and even though Congress omitted the
explicit reference to substantial evidence, it states that "the
administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary., 283
To determine whether the IJ's adverse credibility determination
satisfied the substantial evidence test, the court explained that it would
review the determination "to ensure that it was 'appropriately based on
inconsistent statements, contradictory evidences, and inherently
improbable testimony... in view of the background evidence on country
274. Id. (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 555 (3d Cir. 2001)).
275. ld. at 239-40.
276. Id. at 240.
277. Id. at 233, 241 (citing Albathani, 318 F.3d at 377).
278. Id. at 242-44.
279. Id. at 243.
280. See generally id. at 245, 247, 249-60.
281. Id. at 246-47.
282. Id. at 247 (citing INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481-84 (1992)); see also
IIRIRA § 306(b)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2000), amended by REAL ID Act of
2005, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(a), (b) (West 2006).
283. IIRIRA § 306(b)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
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conditions.' 2 4  Any deference by the court was to be "'expressly
conditioned on support in the record.' ' 285 If the conclusion was "not
based on a specific, cogent reason, but, instead, [was] based on
speculation, conjecture, or an otherwise unsupported personal opinion,
[it will not be upheld] because it will not have been supported by such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would find adequate.,
28 6
In a lengthy dissent, Judge Alito strenuously criticized this
interpretation, labeling part of his dissent, "Reversing the Standard of
Proof., 28 7 Alito claimed that the Third Circuit "turns this standard on its
head and finds that aspects of Dia's testimony should have been found to
be credible because a reasonable person might have found them
believable., 28   The court responded that Alito had applied "the no
reasonable adjudicator standard" so as to deliberately do away with the
need for substantial evidence.2 8
The Third Circuit conducted a detailed assessment of the IJ's
determination of adverse credibility, finding that each point discussed
was not supported by substantial evidence.9 The court cited the
"difficult nature of these types of cases, and the critical importance of
resolving them properly-for the stakes are very high indeed., 291 This
required that any "inferences" drawn from the record "must withstand
scrutiny.,292  Such an approach "breathes life into" the substantial
evidence standard.29' The court vacated the BIA's order of affirmance of
the IJ's decision and remanded the case.28 4
In his dissent, Judge Alito called the majority's analysis of adverse
credibility decisions "seriously flawed" and focused on the difficulties in
detecting false testimony in asylum hearings.9  Initially, Alito conceded
that asylum cases "are among the most difficult that we face. Much is
obviously at stake, but the evidentiary record is very often meager...
284. Dia, 353 F.3d at 249 (quoting In re S-M-J- (Interim Decision), 21 I. & N. Dec. 722
(B.I.A. 1997)).
285. Id. at 249 (quoting Nagi El Moraghy v. Ashcroft, 331 F.3d 195, 205 (1st Cir.
2003)).
286. Id.; see also Nagi El Moraghy, 331 F.3d at 205 (stating that the deference given to
the 1. is reliant on express support in the record for the IJ's findings).
287. Dia, 353 F.3d at 264 (Alito, J., dissenting).
288. Id.
289. Id. at 251 n.22 (majority opinion).
290. Id. at 250-51.
291. Id. at 250.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 251.
294. Id. at 260-61.
295. ld. at 261 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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[and] it is often not reasonable to demand corroboration., 296 However, a
decision based only on the applicant's testimony presented "obvious and
serious problems., 297 Judge Alito stated that "testimony by asylum-
seekers cannot simply be accepted without question., 29  "Persons
wishing to escape deplorable conditions that fall short of persecution
have a strong motive to fabricate tales of persecution, and it must be
recognized that such stories are not hard to construct., 299 Alito noted
Professor David Martin's observation that the government was "rarely
able" to investigate the applicant's claims in the field.3°° Because the
applicant "'will usually be the only available witness to the critical
adjudicative facts of the case ... [the applicant] has substantial incentives
to lie or to embroider the truth (and few disincentives), [which] makes
for a system vulnerable to manipulation.'
30
'
Alito characterized the intent of Congress as one of choosing to
entrust
the responsibility for making these important [credibility]
determinations to the Attorney General, with very limited
judicial participation. Specifically, we must accept a credibility
determination made by those to whom the Attorney General's
authority has been delegated "unless any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary."
This limited role sometimes puts us in the uncomfortable
position of deferring to a credibility determination about which
302we are skeptical. But the statute leaves us no alternative.
Judge Alito then engaged in an extended application of principles of
impeachment in domestic cases to buttress his argument that the court
made three fundamental errors: failure to approve of plausibility
determinations that take into account "'background knowledge' about
human behavior"; inversion of the statutory standard of review by failing
to defer to agency fact-finding where a reasonable adjudicator "could
make a contrary finding"; and failure to consider the totality of the
circumstances "in reviewing the IJ's credibility determination," but
instead focusing "one by one on specific statements . ..and ask[ing]
whether each of those statements is plausible.,
303
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 261-62 (citing Martin, supra note 1, at 1280).
301. Id. at 262 (quoting Martin, supra note 1, at 1280).
302. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(b)).
303. Id. at 262; see also id. at 262-66 (explaining the detailed nature of each legal
error).
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The Eighth Circuit joined the other circuits in a much shorter
December 2003 decision, Loulou v. Ashcroft.3°4 An Ethiopian asylum
applicant claimed political opinion and ethnic group persecution, and
appealed the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's denial of relief, which was
based on lack of credibility and failure by the alien to produce easily
obtainable documentation to corroborate her claims.3 5
The Eighth Circuit quickly dismissed the claim that the "BIA's
summary affirmance violated her due process rights because the
summary affirmance fails to give individualized attention to her case and
frustrates our review. We join our sister circuits in concluding the
streamlined review procedure does not violate an alien's due process
rights. '306
Next, the court delved into her claim that substantial evidence
demonstrated either past family persecution or a well-founded fear of
307future persecution. In sustaining the IJ's adverse finding, the court
essentially found the petitioner to be not credible, based on the fact that
she did not provide obtainable evidence to corroborate her story.3 8 "The
IJ had specific, cogent reasons for disbelieving Loulou .... Under the
circumstances, substantial evidence supports the IJ's decision that
Loulou's failure to call her mother as a witness had a major adverse
impact on her credibility. '"3 9
In Yuk v. Ashcroft,31° the precedent case in the Tenth Circuit issued in
January 2004, the petitioners were Cambodian members of the same
extended family."' All the petitioners were found to be derivative
beneficiaries of a single claim filed by a former police official appealing
summary BIA affirmance of the denial of their applications for asylum.312
The petitioners had entered the United States separately between March
and June 1997, and overstayed their tourist visas, applying for asylum in
March 1998.' 3 The IJ denied asylum and found that the petitioners were
unable to show past persecution or a well-founded fear of future
persecution.314 The appeal, supported by amicus AILF, argued three
claims: first, that the BIA AWO violated their due process rights and
304. 354 F.3d 706, 708 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 987 (2004).
305. Id.
306. Id. at 708-09.
307. Id. at 709.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 709-10.
310. 355 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2004).
311. Id. at 1224.
312. Id. at 1224-25.
313. Id. at 1224.
314. Id. at 1225.
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administrative law; second, that the IJ and BIA acted in error by not
finding past persecution; and third, that the IJ and BIA erred in finding
changed conditions in Cambodia to the extent that the petitioners no
longer had a well-founded fear of future persecution.315
The court stated that "Albathani was the first decision to address this
issue, and its analysis has been widely followed .... We generally follow
it as well.,
1 6
The Tenth Circuit reviewed the IJ's determination of the petitioner's
refugee status issue using the substantial evidence standard.317 The court
noted that the BIA's adverse determination of eligibility for asylum
"'must be upheld if 'supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative
evidence on the record considered as a whole.' It can be reversed only if
the evidence presented by [the applicant] was such that a reasonable
factfinder would have to conclude that the requisite fear of persecution
existed.' 318 The court noted that it does not "'weigh the evidence or...
evaluate the witnesses' credibility.'
319
Substantial evidence supported the IJ's conclusion that persecution
had not occurred in the past, and that State Department country reports
relied on by the IJ constituted substantial evidence of changed
conditions, thus barring a finding of a well-founded fear of future
320persecution. It was also "not [the court's] prerogative to reweigh the
evidence, but only to decide if substantial evidence supports the IJ's
decision."
3 21
The final two of the eleven federal circuits issued decisions in March
2004 that adhered closely to the nine earlier precedents. In Zhang v. U.S.
Dep't of Justice,322 the Second Circuit upheld a BIA AWO of an IJ
decision to deny a Chinese male asylum on the ground of persecution for
violating China's birth control policy.12 The IJ found him not to be a
credible applicant because "his testimony was 'neither consistent nor
plausible. ' '32 4 The Second Circuit summarily dismissed claims that "the
Ii's credibility findings were not grounded in the record," and that the
315. Id. at 1228 & n.6.
316. Id. at 1229 (internal citations omitted).
317. Id. at 1233.
318. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481
(1992)).
319. Id. (omission in original) (quoting Woldemeskel v. INS, 257 F.3d 1185, 1189 (10th
Cir. 2001)).
320. Id. at 1234-36.
321. Id. at 1236.
322. 362 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
323. Id. at 156.
324. Id.
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applicant was a victim of persecution.3 25 The court then focused its entire
opinion on Zhang's due process challenge to the BIA streamlined review
procedures.326
Citing the ten precedents from other circuits, the Second Circuit held
that "the streamlining regulations' provision for summary affirmance of
IJ decisions by a single Board member does not deprive an asylum
applicant of due process. 3 27 An alien's right to appeal derives only from
statute. "'The Attorney General could dispense with the Board and
delegate her powers to the immigration judges, or could give the Board
discretion to choose which cases to review.' 3 29 Even criminal defendants
lack any constitutional right to an appeal.33 The court noted, "'[t]he
existence of his right to appeal and the parameters of that right find their
roots in statutes and rules."'331
Echoing the reasoning in Dia v. Ashcroft, the Second Circuit reiterated
that although "[v]arious sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act
indicate that Congress did contemplate some form of appellate review,"
it was "silent as to the manner and extent of any administrative appeal,
leaving that determination to the Attorney General, who, in turn, has
delegated this responsibility to the BIA. 33 2  In that circumstance,
Vermont Yankee deference to the administrative agency was
appropriate.333 The availability of "judicial review pursuant to 8 § U.S.C.
1252" supported a conclusion that streamlining did not violate due
334process.
The Court cited the Denko and Falcon Carriche cases to hold that
streamlining regulations met the Matthews v. Eldridge test.3 5 The court
stated that:
325. Id.
326. Id. at 156-59.
327. Id. at 157; see also id. (citing Khattak v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 250, 252-53 (4th Cir.
2003)) (rejecting the idea that the streamlining regulations were "impermissibly
retroactive").
328. Id.
329. Id. (quoting Guentchev v. INS, 77 F.3d 1036, 1037 (7th Cir. 1996)).
330. Id.
331. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Furman v. United States, 720 F.2d 263, 264
(2d Cir. 1983) (per curiam)).
332. Id.; see also supra notes 272-73.
333. Zhang, 362 F.3d at 157 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47) (2000) (providing that "an
order of deportation is not 'final' until . . . the BIA has passed on it"); 8 U.S.C. §
1158(d)(5)(A)(iii)-(iv) (2000) (providing "time limits for filing and resolving
administrative appeals"); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4) (2000) (providing for an alien's right to be
informed of the right to appeal a removal order)).
334. Id. at 158.
335. Id. at 159 (citing Denko v. INS, 351 F.3d 717, 730 n.10 (6th Cir. 2003); Falcon
Carriche v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845, 851-52 (9th Cir. 2003)).
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Whether the streamlining regulations will or will not add to our
burden, however, is not the issue before us. Our concern is
whether streamlining deprives an alien of the process that he is
due by law. Under applicable laws and regulations, even after
streamlining, an applicant for asylum or withholding of removal
remains entitled to a full hearing on his asylum claims, a
reasoned opinion from the IJ, the opportunity for BIA review,
and the right to seek relief from the courts. This is the process
Zhang received.336
In the final case of this series, Blanco de Belbruno v. Ashcroft,37 the
Fourth Circuit upheld a denial of asylum to a Guatemalan citizen and her
five derivative family members who had originally entered the United
States fourteen years previously and had overstayed their tourist visas by
eighteen months."' The court denied Belbruno's claims that the
streamlining regulations are inconsistent with the INA, that application
of the regulations to her case violated her due process rights, and that the
regulations were impermissibly retroactive.339  Application of the
Chevron doctrine to the Attorney General's interpretation of the INA
was significantly influenced by the government's plenary powers.3" The
court stated that it was "mindful of the fact that 'the power to expel or
include aliens [is] a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the
Government's political departments largely immune from judicial
control.'
3 41
Dismissing Belbruno's claim that the AWO had deprived her of due
process, the Fourth Circuit noted that "[j]udicial review, not judicial
micromanagement of BIA procedures, is the proper response., 342 BIA
summary affirmance procedures were "not unlike summary disposition
procedures routinely used by appellate courts., 343  Streamlining
"reserve[d] appellate explication for issues that require it."'344 It also was
336. Id.
337. 362 F.3d 272 (4th Cir. 2004).
338. Id. at 275-76. The petitioner's husband, a citizen of Argentina, had filed the
original family political asylum application claiming a fear of persecution from that
country in 1992. Id. at 276. The family was charged in 1998 with violation of INA section
237(a)(1)(B) (failure to possess valid immigration documents at time of application for
admission). Id. The husband then withdrew his asylum petition, and the Guatemalan wife
then filed for political asylum in her own name, with her Argentine husband as a
derivative applicant. Id.
339. Id. at 275-76, 278.
340. Id. at 278.
341. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977)).
342. Id. at 280-81.
343. Id. at 281.
344. Id.
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not significant that the AWO was issued by a single BIA member.345
"[T]here is no magic-and certainly no due process implications-in any
given number of reviewing judges. What matters is that Belbruno was
able to take the decision of the Immigration Judge to an authority with
the responsibility to overturn an erroneous decision. 3 46 Finally, the
court held that streamlining was not impermissibly retroactive because it
did not attach "'new legal consequences to events completed before its
enactment,"' but only affected "'the body that adjudicates the claims. ''3 47
V. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE APPELLATE DECISIONS FOR THE LAW OF
RELIEF FROM REMOVAL
The twelve streamlining decisions following Albathani are instructive
as to the state of the law of relief on three levels. First, they provide a
clear articulation of the minimum due process now available to aliens in
the United States facing expulsion. Second, they provide a better
understanding of the outer limits of jurisdiction-stripping. Finally, and
most significant for critics of U.S. expulsion policy like FAIR, the
holdings in these cases on the substantive law of relief highlight
pervasive, systemic problems within the substantive law itself.
As an advocacy organization opposed to mass immigration, both illegal
and legal, FAIR has been less constrained in its scrutiny of the expulsion
appeals system than other institutional stakeholders in the status quo, in
particular the immigration bar and federal bureaucracy.348  The
remainder of this article attempts to frame a policy argument that these
systemic issues must be acknowledged and addressed by the professional
constituencies in the federal agencies, academia, and other legal policy
institutions before the division of labor between EOIR and the federal
courts in the disposition of alien claims for relief can be stabilized.
A. The Minimum Requirements of Due Process at the Agency and
Appellate Court Levels
After the Albathani line of cases, it seems clear that recent attempts to
create or expand rights of aliens to administrative review of expulsion
decisions have not succeeded. The appellate courts emphasized again
345. Id. at 282-83.
346. Id. at 282.
347. Id. at 283 (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 321 (2001); Khattack v. Ashcroft,
332 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2003)).
348. See, e.g., FAIR Public Comments, supra note 52, at 1, 3-4.
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and again that "[a]n alien has no constitutional right to any
administrative appeal at all.,
349
Even after the creation of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), the BIA remains an administrative agency created and operated
under the executive authority of the Attorney General. DOJ regulations
require that "there shall be ... a Board of Immigration Appeals. 3 50 The
BIA must adjudicate immigration appeals so as to provide precedential
guidance to DHS, IJs, immigrants, and immigration attorneys. 3 1 BIA
regulations also require that appeals be adjudicated in a manner that is
legally correct, impartial, independent, and timely.352  In theory, the
Attorney General can reform, reorganize, or even eliminate the BIA.353
The list of an alien's minimum statutorily created rights is neither long
nor complex. 4 Compliance with these procedural entitlements could be
delegated to DHS personnel, if EOIR was ever abolished.
Of course, agency authority remains limited in practice by the
existence of due process protections for aliens that the government seeks
to expel. The Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in
deportation proceedings, and the right of aliens in immigration
proceedings to challenge detention orders via writ of habeas corpus has
been recognized for more than a century.356 But there is no constitutional
requirement for IJ or BIA review of expulsion orders, should Congress
delegate authority to issue such orders to immigration officers or other
DHS officials.357
The Albathani line of cases emphasized that streamlined BIA review
procedures raised no due process issues, either in the way they were
implemented or in the scope of review actually provided. The affirmance
by a single BIA member of an IJ's decision without giving additional
349. Albathani v. INS, 318 F.3d 365, 375 (1st Cir. 2003); see also Zhang v. U.S. Dep't of
Justice, 362 F.3d 155, 157 (2d Cir. 2004); Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 242 (3d Cir. 2003);
Denko v. INS, 351 F.3d 717, 729 (6th Cir. 2003).
350. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1) (2006).
351. Id. § 1003.1(d)(1), (g).
352. Id. § 1003.1(d)(1).
353. See id. § 1003.1(a)(1).
354. See, e.g., INA § 238(b)(4)(A)-(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b)(4)(A)-(F) (2000).
355. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States,
142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892).
356. Reno, 507 U.S. at 306; Nishimura Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 660.
357. See Albathani v. INS, 318 F.3d 365, 376 (1st Cir. 2003).
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reasons or a separate opinion does not violate BIA regulations358 or due
359process.
BIA streamlining regulations met the Mathews v. Eldridge three-part
due process test.36° Streamlining procedures are workload management
devices that do not establish that review did not take place."' Similarly,
hardship claims in COR cases are not so inherently fact-based as to make
single-member affirmance a violation of due process.3 6 2
The immigration bar has not ceased to express concerns that recent
congressional attempts to simplify expulsion proceedings risks renewed
constitutional litigation arising from suspension of habeas challenges to
363its jurisdiction-stripping provisions. In particular, the 2005 expansion
of circuit court jurisdiction by the REAL ID Act to include any
"question of law" is expected to provoke renewed litigation, in particular
over mixed questions of law and fact.364  The prospect of renewed
litigation has not, however, seemed to deter Congress from continuing
the trend of streamlining procedures and limiting immigration litigation,
appeals to the Board of Immigration Appeals, and judicial review.365
B. Deference to Agency Fact-Finding
While the appellate courts fought after 1996 to retain jurisdiction over
statutory interpretation and constitutional review of expulsion cases, the
Supreme Court admonished the appellate courts in a countervailing line
of cases to give more deference to the determinations of the immigration
adjudicators; particularly when the IJ decision was upheld by the BIA,
both in reviewing findings of fact and statutory interpretations within the
366
BIA's area of expertise.
358. Blanco de Belbruno v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 272, 279-80 (4th Cir. 2004); Mendoza v.
U.S. Att'y Gen., 327 F.3d 1283, 1288-89 (11th Cir. 2003).
359. Loulou v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 706, 7-8 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 987
(2004); Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 238 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc); Denko v. INS, 351 F.3d
717, 728, 730 (6th Cir. 2003); Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845, 850-51 (9th Cir.
2003); Soadjede v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 830, 832 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam); Albathani, 318
F.3d at 874-75.
360. Zhang v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 362 F.3d 155, 159 (2d Cir. 2004); Falcon Carriche,
350 F.3d at 851-52.
361. Albathani, 318 F.3d at 378-79.
362. Falcon Carriche, 350 F.3d at 852.
363. See Morawetz, supra note 11, at 8.
364. See Gerald L. Neuman, The REAL ID Act and the Suspension Clause, 9
BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 1555, 1557, 1562 (2005).
365. See generally MARGARET MIKYUNG LEE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., No.
RL33410, IMMIGRATION LITIGATION REFORM (2006) (discussing jurisdiction-stripping
proposals in H.R. 4437, S. 2454, S. Amdt. 3192, S.2611/S.2612, and other 2006 bills).
366. See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424 (1999) (noting the failure of the
Ninth Circuit to defer to BIA statutory interpretation of the serious nonpolitical crime
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In 1992, the most important of these landmark cases, INS v. Elias-
Zacarias, articulated the substantial evidence test in the immigration
context.367 Four years later, Congress codified the formula as part of
IIRIRA, providing that for judicial review of BIA determinations,
"administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary. ' '368 IIRIRA
also expressly stripped the Article III courts of authority to consider
additional evidence, even material evidence. 369 Elias-Zacharias remains
the standard of review used by the federal courts to define the scope of
their review of fact-finding by DHS officials, IJs, and the BIA.37 °
BIA Member John Guendelsberger has pointed out that "[a]fter Elias-
Zacarias, some circuit courts described their review of Board decisions
on questions of fact as 'highly deferential,' 'extraordinarily deferential,'
'extremely deferential,' or 'exceedingly narrow."'371 While this language
may suggest a more heightened degree of deference to findings in
immigration proceedings, Guendelsberger emphasized that, doctrinally
at least, "the degree of deference accorded immigration fact-finding [has
not differed significantly from the kinds of] deference afforded in . . .
administrative determinations" by other agencies.
The decisions favoring judicial deference to agency fact-finding
appeared to have culminated in 2002, some months before the Albathani
decision, when the Supreme Court held "that the Ninth Circuit
overstepped the bounds of its authority in deciding an issue of asylum
eligibility" not decided by the BIA. 3 3 In INS v. Ventura, the Supreme
Court held that the Ninth Circuit should have remanded the question of
exception). The agency had expertise over a statute it administered, and Chevron
deference thus should have applied. Id; INS v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 27, 30-32
(1996) (giving deference to agency decisions regarding denials of discretionary waivers);
INS v. Elias-Zacharias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992) (giving deference to agency findings of
fact). See generally Guendelsberger, supra note 76, at 617-34 (providing an overview of
judicial deference to agency decisions).
367. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483-84 (finding that the substantial evidence test in the
asylum context allows reversal only where the reviewing court not only supports a
contrary conclusion, but compels it); Georgis v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 962, 967-68 (7th Cir.
2003).
368. IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 306(b)(4)(B), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-608 (codified at
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2000)) (emphasis added), amended by REAL ID Act of 2005, 8
U.S.C.A. § 1252(a), (b) (West Supp. 2006).
369. See IIRIRA § 306(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) ("[T]he court may not order the
taking of additional evidence under [28 U.S.C. §] 2347(c) .... ).
370. See, e.g., Moin v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 415, 418 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting that the
Administrative Procedure Act "mandates substantial evidence review of administrative
agency fact findings," the standard applied to BIA streamlining procedures in Albathani).
371. Guendelsberger, supra note 76, at 628 & n.136 (citations omitted).
372. Id. at 628.
373. Id. at 606 (citing INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12 (2002) (per curiam)).
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changed country conditions to the BIA, rather than issue a decision on its
own.374 "A court of appeals is 'not generally empowered to conduct a de
novo review into the matter being reviewed ... ,,,37 Instead, the court
noted that "'the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand
to the agency for additional investigation or explanation.
'
'
3 76
In the BIA streamlining cases, the appellate courts also have seemed
to acknowledge, at the doctrinal level, the deference owed to agency
377interpretations. For example, an agency decision to streamline was
non-reviewable where it was based on a discretionary determination and
378
appellate court jurisdiction had been removed by statute.. There is
agreement among several circuits that the Vermont Yankee doctrine
requires the courts to give great deference to the BIA developing its own
procedures. 79 However, at least two courts felt the need to state that
judicial review of certain BIA decisions is not barred by the APA
because "judicially manageable standards [are] available to a reviewing
court.""3 " In Dia v. Ashcroft, the Third Circuit held that even the IIRIRA
statutory reformulation has not significantly modified the traditional
substantial evidence test.381
In practice, the clear difference between circuits in the rate of reversal
of BIA decisions suggests that appellate non-acquiesence to
administrative factual findings remains a significant problem.382 The
Ninth Circuit was referenced by EOIR for its failure to defer to
administrative fact-finding.383 The BIA Study confirmed what it called
374. Id. at 609.
375. Id. at 610 (quoting Ventura, 537 U.S. at 16).
376. Id. (quoting Ventura, 537 U.S. at 16); see also Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d
396, 398 (3d Cir. 2003).
377. See Hamdan v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 1051, 1058 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Heckler v.
Chancy, 470 U.S. 821, 837-38 (1985).
378. Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845, 853-54 (9th Cir. 2003).
379. Blanco de Belbruno v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 272, 280 (4th Cir. 2004); Zhang v. U.S.
Dep't of Justice, 362 F.3d 155, 157 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam); Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d
228, 238 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc); Denko v. INS, 351 F.3d 717, 730-31 n.10 (6th Cir. 2003);
Falcon Carriche, 350 F.3d at 850.
380. Denko, 351 F.3d at 731-32; see also Georgis v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 962, 967 (7th
Cir. 2003).
381. Dia, 353 F.3d at 247-48 (defining substantial evidence as "'such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion' . . . and it must be
enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the
conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury" (quoting NLRB v.
Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939))).
382. Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin, supra note 2, at 77-78; see also id. at 54, 55, tbl.1
(indicating that appeal rates during summer 2004 ranged from 9% in the Eleventh Circuit
to 60% in the Eighth Circuit).
383. Procedural Reforms, supra note 6, at 54,891.
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"the 'conventional wisdom' that the Ninth Circuit is more sympathetic to
alien's claims-particularly asylum claims-than any of the other
circuits. '"" One line of attack on deference doctrine attempts to work
around the statutory and Supreme Court mandate by claiming an
exception still exists for review of factual determinations made by an IJ if
a non-discretionary ground for relief was also a factor. 8 5 Opponents of
streamlining have seized upon this disparity to insist that the BIA
reforms amount to an "abdication of quality review in the interests of
expeditious decision-making.
3 86
VI. UNADDRESSED STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF RELIEF
The substantive law of relief from expulsion poses many well-known
conceptual and evidentiary difficulties. A "value-neutral" approach to
judicial review in expulsion cases may be the rhetorical ideal, but few, if
any, stakeholders argue for such an approach in practice. The BIA
streamlining cases highlighted the dilemmas facing the judicial review
process, as the twelve challenges were brought in a variety of factual and
381
statutory scenarios. Most commentators find these difficulties reason
to tolerate a systemic bias in favor of the alien petitioner.390 I would
suggest that this approach has become dysfunctional.
Entitlement to relief is almost always the determinative issue in both
administrative and judicial appeals. The three major types of relief from
expulsion are persecution-based relief, cancellation of removal and
related relief, and waivers of inadmissibility or excludability.3 9' Some
types of relief are mandatory if eligibility standards are met, but most
forms of relief require the government to determine whether the alien
merits a favorable exercise of discretion.393 Whatever doctrine INA
384. Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin, supra note 2, at 77 n.303; see, e.g., Wang v.
Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 1015, 1023 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding an exception to Ventura based on
"rare circumstances").
385. Cf He v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 593, 595-96 (9th Cir. 2003); Begzatowski v. INS, 278
F.3d 665, 668 (7th Cir. 2002).
386. See Seipp & Feal, supra note 9, at 2012.
387. See infra notes 388-97 and accompanying text.
388. Motomura, supra note 127, at 451-52.
389. See, e.g., Blanco de Belbruno v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 272, 276-78 (4th Cir. 2004);
Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc); Falcon Carriche v.
Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845, 848 (9th Cir. 2003).
390. Cf Matthew H. Joseph, Note, Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Elias
Zacarias: Partially Closing the Door on Political Asylum, 52 MD. L. REv. 478, 500 (1993).
391. See ROBERT JAMES MCWHIRTER, THE CRIMINAL LAWYER'S GUIDE TO
IMMIGRATION LAW: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 20 (2001).
392. Id.; see also Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin, supra note 2, at 12 (discussing the
expulsion process).
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section 242(a)(2)(B) may embody, the immigration interests, the
immigration bar, and the DHS administrators will continue to take
advantage of the expanded doctrine of prosecutorial discretion. Both the
BIA and the Article III courts fully understand that prosecutorial
discretion currently plays a very large role, even if it is difficult to
measure."' Aliens must generally concede deportability as a condition to
requesting relief.394 Although the formal burden of proof remains on the
alien applicant to establish that he or she meets the elements of eligibility
for relief from expulsion,9 in practice there is a strong and pervasive bias
among the regulatory and stakeholder institutions to give the applicant
what Professor Martin called "the benefit of the doubt.,
396
Administrative and judicial assessments of applicant credibility, the
legislative facts of international conditions and changed country
conditions, and the legal recognition of novel particular social groups are
examples of core areas of the law of relief where the utility of general
legal principles has been preempted by structural pro-applicant bias. For
example, Professor Martin has pointed out that the basic tools of
confrontation and cross-examination rarely play a role in expulsion
proceedings, since it is unusual for any witness other than the applicant
and possibly a family member to testify.397 Other core adjudications with
inherent bias problems would include hardship determinations in COR
cases, and the still-ubiquitous waiver and reconsideration provisions.
A. Asylum
Critics in the immigration bar have noted that post-streamlining
criticism of BIA and IJ decisions appearing in circuit court decisions have
arisen largely in asylum cases "where a claimant's credibility is always of
393. Michael M. Hethmon, The Chimera and the Cop, 8 UDC[DCSL L. REV. 83, 138-
39 (2004) (discussing the 2000 Meissner memorandum). The authors of the BIA Study
note:
The process by which the government expels someone from the United States
can be broken down into three basic stages: identifying the person as potentially
subject to expulsion, deciding to expel the person, and ensuring that the person
actually leaves the country. At each step along the way, the government may
exercise prosecutorial discretion not to proceed further, thereby allowing the
person to remain in the country, at least temporarily.
Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin, supra note 2, at 12.
394. See, e.g., Begzatowski v. INS, 278 F.3d 665, 668 (7th Cir. 2002).
395. See, e.g., Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin, supra note 2, at 13-14.
396. Martin, supra note 1, at 1283; see, e.g., In re Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. 467, 476 (B.I.A.
1987) (Heilman, Bd. Member, concurring in part, dissenting in part) (finding that asylum
laws are humanitarian).
397. Martin, supra note 1, at 1349.
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great concern. 3 98 Professor Martin described the adjudication of asylum
applications as a three-part process, combining:
retrospective factfinding about past events specific to the [alien
applicant] .... broader determinations about the practices of the
government or other alleged persecutors in the home country..
. [and] an informed prediction (not truly a finding) about the
degree and type of danger the particular applicant is likely to
face upon return [to their home country] ....
The Supreme Court has held that asylum requires demonstration by
the applicant that a "reasonable possibility" exists that the alien will be
persecuted in his or her home country.
In theory, DOJ could expel aliens "already judged to be 'refugees'
under the Cardoza-Fonseca standard, if they fall short of the showing
required to claim the mandatory nonrefoulement protection." 41  In
practice, the view of advocates for asylum applicants, that the utility of
general legal principles are limited by the intensely factual nature of
asylum claims, has prevailed.i Professor Martin has written that all
asylum decisions are made in a "highly charged policy context., 403 More
recently, immigration lawyer Mark Van Der Hout has suggested that the
results in asylum cases in the Ninth Circuit can be shown to depend on
the political views of the three judges composing the review panel.4
Given the vagueness of the underlying standards, this is not surprising.
Past persecution does not require corroboration, and may be established
solely through the applicant's credible testimony,4°5 but an applicant need
not have suffered persecution in the past to qualify for asylum.4°  A
"well-founded fear" of persecution can certainly exist where there is less
than a fifty percent chance that persecution will occur, and might even
exist when there is only a ten percent chance of suffering persecution.407
398. See Seipp & Feal, supra note 9, at 2005-06.
399. Martin, supra note 1, at 1280 (footnotes omitted).
400. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987).
401. Martin, supra note 1, at 1265.
402. See Comm. on Fed. Courts, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., supra note 15, at
257; see, e.g., Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 70, 82 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that the
"asylum application process requires a good faith inquiry into whether an applicant is
entitled to this country's protection, and should never resemble 'a search for justification
to deport' (quoting Senathirajah v. INS, 157 F.3d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 1998))).
403. Martin, supra note 1, at 1253.
404. Cooper & Bazar, supra note 57.
405. Garrovillas v. INS, 156 F.3d 1010, 1016 (9th Cir. 1998).
406. Poradisova, 420 F.3d at 77-78 ("To establish eligibility for asylum, a petitioner
must show that he has suffered past persecution ... or that he has a well-founded fear of
future persecution...").
407. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,431, 440 (1987).
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Professor Martin points out that the Supreme Court has declined to "'set
forth a detailed description of how the well-founded fear test should be
applied,' leaving that term to acquire 'concrete meaning through a
process of case-by-case adjudication. ' 40
8
Compounding this structural ambiguity is the problem of credibility
determinations. Factual findings and credibility determinations are
integral in the context of relief from expulsion, but are also
fundamentally problematic. 4  Critics have identified "excessive reliance
on plausibility determinations by the IJ's" as the basis for many circuit
court reversals of expulsion orders.4'0 At the same time, the appellate
courts have emphasized the presumption of credibility in asylum
• 411
proceedings. Credibility determinations were also at issue in several of
the BIA streamlining cases. 41' The judges in these cases debated how to
handle the intensely factual nature of asylum claims, the weak
evidentiary standards, and the fiction of the honest applicant, factors that
limit the utility of general legal principles. 413 The circuit courts continue
to base reversals of BIA decisions on excessive reliance on credibility
determinations by Js under a "benefit of the doubt" policy and
practice. 14 This activist role of the circuit courts in reviewing credibility
determinations seems to directly conflict with the doctrinal expressions
of deference to IJ and agency fact-finding reflected in the Albathani line
of cases. The most recent response of Congress to this conflict remains
ambiguous, with statutory attempts to tinker with evidentiary standards
in asylum cases raising in turn new questions of law that appear destined
for the appellate courts.4 5
408. Martin, supra note 1, at 1264 (quoting Cardoza- Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 448).
409. See Susan Burkhardt, The Contours of Conformity: Behavioral Decision Theory
and the Pitfalls of the 2002 Reforms of Immigration Procedures, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 35,
77-78, 78 n.215 (2004).
410. Seipp & Feal, supra note 9, at 2011 (citing cases).
411. See KURZBAN, supra note 140, at 819-21 (discussing BIA review of IJ credibility
determinations).
412. Seipp & Feal, supra note 9, at 2011-12; see, e.g., Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 234
(3d Cir. 2004) (en banc); Georgis v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 962, 968 (7th Cir. 2003).
413. See, e.g., Dia, 353 F.3d at 248-50; Albathani v. INS, 318 F.3d 365, 373-74 (1st Cir.
2003).
414. See Martin, supra note 1, at 1283; Seipp & Feal, supra note 9, at 2011.
415. The REAL ID Act of 2005 introduced a new "central reason" standard of proof
for the nexus between a ground for asylum and persecution on account of that ground, and
restricted the circumstances when an applicant need not provide corroborative evidence in
an asylum or withholding of removal case. See REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13,
§ 101(a)(3)(B)(i), 119 Stat. 302, 303 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i)). At the
DHS, the Office of the Ombudsman proposed a formal bifurcation of administrative
adjudication of asylum and withholding or removal applications. Applications from illegal
aliens would no longer be processed by USCIS, but would be referred directly to an
immigration judge for adjudication in the context of a removal proceeding. See Letter
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B. Country Conditions and Changed Conditions
The decisions in Mendoza v. U.S. Attorney GeneraP16 (Eleventh
Circuit), Dia v. Ashcroft4 7 (Third Circuit), and Yuk v. Ashcroft4 8 (Tenth
Circuit) grappled with the evidentiary dilemma of alien country
conditions and changed conditions, Professor Martin's classic "coast of
Bohemia" problem.4 9 The provision of background evidence on country
conditions is intended to allow the trier of fact to determine whether a
claim for relief is plausible.4 0 However, the BIA has never issued a
decision providing explicit guidance on how an IJ should weigh thet.- 421
relative probative value of documents assessing country conditions.
The inability of the BIA to articulate a functional nexus between publicly
available background evidence and the particularized testimony of the
applicant, or to assess how changes in overseas conditions may have
affected that nexus, has left the appellate courts with the dubious task of
assessing the plausibility of predictions made by an IJ or the BIA as to
the probability that the alien applicant would experience future foreign
persecution or hardship if expelled.
Professor Martin's 1990 critique of asylum adjudication was especially
skeptical of the ability of a neutral judicial adjudicator to use country
guidelines to make future persecution determinations, on threea 421
grounds. Martin argued that official country reports "are useful only
when they can be based on particularized characteristics that sharply
distinguish a certain group from the rest of the population. Most
persecution... does not follow such crisp patterns.",411 Martin concluded
that "[gluidelines that must use such vague terms are probably worse
than no guidelines at all.,
424
from Prakash Khatri, Ombudsman, U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., to Emilio
Gonzalez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs. (Mar. 20, 2006), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/ClSOmbudsman RR 24-Asylum-Status-03-20-
06.pdf (recommending that USCIS "limit its adjudication of 1-589 applications for asylum
and withholding of removal to those submitted from individuals who are in valid non-
immigrant status in the United States").
416. 327 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2003).
417. 353 F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc).
418. 355 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2004).
419. Yuk, 355 F.3d at 1234-36; Dia, 353 F.3d at 249; Mendoza, 327 F.3d at 1288;
Martin, supra note 1, at 1273-75.
420. Guan Shan Liao v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 293 F.3d 61, 71 (2d Cir. 2002).
421. See Susan K. Kerns, Note, Country Conditions Documentation in U.S. Asylum
Cases: Leveling the Evidentiary Playing Field, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 197, 205
(2000).
422. See Martin, supra note 1, at 1359-60.
423. Id.
424. Id. at 1360.
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Martin also conceded that reliance on country guidelines creates a bias
in favor of the applicant.4 2 1 Individual applicants are encouraged to take
affirmative reports of persecution or hardships and match their personal
circumstances as closely as possible to a current "winning" profile, evenS 421
at the risk of encouraging fraudulent testimony, In contrast, any
routine official use of negative reports to streamline the issuance of an
expulsion order may come under attack for impermissibly restricting the• 421
ability of applicants to testify as to unique circumstances.
A related area where significant problems exist for the appellate judge
is the adjudication of the expanding universe of novel social groups, an
area of the law of relief without theoretical limits. The granting of relief
on the basis of membership in a novel social group reflects recognition by
the court of both a new conclusory legal analogy and of country
conditions that match the elements of the group. Professor Martin
observed in 1990 these novel cases constitute a "fairly small percentage
of the caseload., 429 That context has changed by 2006, as novel social
group claims continue to attract and consume significant judicial
430
resources.
C. Cancellation of Removal Based on Hardship
Hardship determinations in COR cases were another ambiguous
substantive area of the law of relief from expulsion examined in the
Albathani line of cases.43' To receive cancellation of removal relief under
INA section 240A, an alien, other than certain permanent legal residents,
must "establish[] that removal would result in exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship to the alien's spouse parent, or child," and that the
person is a United States citizen or a legal permanent resident. 3' The
legislative history of the hardship provisions indicates that Congress has
repeatedly expressed an intention that relief should only be granted
433
where expulsion would cause extreme hardship. Unlike asylum cases,the courts have upheld the elimination of judicial review of BIA
425. See id.
426. See id.
427. See id.
428. See, e.g., Annette Lopez, Comment, Creating Hope for Victims of Domestic
Violence in Political Asylum Law, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 603, 604 (2004).
429. See Martin, supra note 1, at 1363.
430. See Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin, supra note 2, at 53 fig.5 (displaying rise in
appeal rate).
431. See, e.g., Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 845, 848 (9th Cir. 2003).
432. INA § 240A(b)(1)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (2000), amended by Violence
Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, 8 U.S.C.A. §
1229b (West Supp. 2006).
433. H.R. REP. No. 104-828, at 213-14 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
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discretionary hardship determinations under INS section 240A 4
However, even in this restrictive doctrinal environment, the Ninth
Circuit still found that it had the authority to review a claim that BIA
435
application of the COR hardship standard violated due process.
In COR cases, an I's factual determinations supporting hardship
claims are reviewed by the BIA under the clearly erroneous standard.436
But whether facts amount to "exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship" is reviewed de novo.437 This standard remains ambiguous,
however, and "does not have to be literally interpreted or strictly
construed, or at least not more strictly than 'extreme hardship,"'
especially if the case "otherwise merits the favorable exercise of
discretion.,
38
D. Waivers
The still-ubiquitous waivers and reconsideration provisions that
encourage serial and piecemeal proceedings based on claims of changed
factual or procedural circumstances appeared as a factor in at least one
of the Albathani cases.439 In addition to appeals of denial of asylum and
cancellation of removal,440 the BIA has jurisdiction, by regulation, to
hear: appeals of denials of former INA section 212(c) waivers;
discretionary decisions on all family preference petitions (except
automatic revocations or appeals by beneficiaries), waivers of
inadmissibility for nonimmigrants under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3);
adjustment of status applications under 8 U.S.C. § 1255, or rescission of
status under 8 U.S.C. § 1256;44 ' and decisions relating to detention in
removal, including IJ decisions for continuation of detention beyond the
434. INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), amended by REAL ID Act of
2005, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(a), (b) (West Supp. 2006); Alvarez-Delmuro v. Ashcroft, 360 F.3d
1254, 1256-57 (10th Cir. 2004); Romero-Torres v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 887, 888 (9th Cir.
2003).
435. Ramirez-Perez v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 1001, 1005 (9th Cir. 2003).
436. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3) (2006).
437. See id.
438. Curtis Pierce, The Benefits of "Hardship": Historical Analysis and Current
Standards for Avoiding Removal, 76 INTERPRETER RELEASES 405, 410 (1999).
439. See, e.g., Denko v. INS, 351 F.3d 717, 721, 724 (6th Cir. 2003).
440. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3), (9). The former 10,000 annual cap on admissions was
eliminated by the REAL ID Act. 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b)(2000), amended by REAL ID Act of
2005, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1159(b) (West Supp. 2006).
441. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b). Adjustment of status under INA section 245 allows an
alien to gain legal permanent resident status without departing and being lawfully
readmitted as an immigrant, and is available both prior to and during expulsion
proceedings. INA § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2000), amended by Violence Against Women
and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255(i) (West Supp.
2006); see also MCWHIRTER, supra note 391, at 9.
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statutory removal period. 2 However, the Board lacks the authority to
enter a final order of removal because expulsion decisions may be subject
to judicial review pursuant to INA section 241(a)(5). 44'
The widely acknowledged sympathy of the Ninth and Second Circuits
to alien claims, in particular asylum claims, and their respective records
of declining to defer to administrative fact-finding, seem to directly
correlate with the high caseloads in these circuits. This judicial activism
could be interpreted as evidence of resistance to the countervailing line
of Supreme Court decisions," culminating in INS v. Ventura, criticizing
de novo appellate review and urging greater deference to EOIR's agency
expertise .
Critics of the BIA reforms characterize this tension as inherent in due
process requirements. 6 The prevailing view of the immigrant interests
and the judiciary seems to be that expulsion cases are not amenable to
traditional criteria. 447  FAIR disagrees."8  "[W]hen the record can
reasonably be read in more than one way, [the rule from the Ventura line
of cases is that] the court should not substitute its preference for what it
considers the more reasonable view of the evidence."" 9 The striking
reported differences between the circuits in the rate of reversing BIA
decisions, both before and after implementation of streamlining reforms,
can credibly be explained by the personal opinions and worldviews of the
judges who have been left by Congress to reduce these penumbras and
emanations to predictions as to future events in foreign lands.40  The
judges in the activist circuits, if they felt it were necessary, could exercise
a much greater level of restraint and even skepticism, by utilizing, for
example, the substantial evidence test, in order to reduce their caseloads
to levels comparable to those of the less sympathetic circuits.451
442. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(14).
443. See KURZBAN, supra note 140, at 805; see also Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin,
supra note 2, at 19-20 (discussing judicial review of removal orders).
444. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 418, 423, 431 (1999) (holding that the
failure of the Ninth Circuit to defer to BIA statutory interpretation of the serious
nonpolitical crime exception to deportation withholding was erroneous because the
agency has expertise over a statute it administers, and Chevron deference thus should
apply); INS v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 27, 32 (1996) (giving deference when
reviewing denials of discretionary waivers); INS v. Elias-Zacharias, 502 U.S. 478, 481
(1992) (giving deference when reviewing findings of fact).
445. INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16-18 (2002) (per curiam).
446. See FAIR Public Comments, supra note 52, at 3-4.
447. Cf id. at 4-5.
448. Id. at 3-4.
449. Guendelsberger, supra note 76, at 629.
450. See MacLean, supra note 21; notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
451. For a discussion of the role of discretionary decisionmaking and due process
rights, compare Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 831-33 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating that
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VII. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTRAINTS ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND
JUDICIAL REFORM
Finally, several broader concerns exist that have barely appeared in
the legal literature, although the concerns are a longstanding focus of
debate and controversy for immigration policymakers.
A. Continued Massive Demand
According to FAIR, "[i]mmigration to the United States, one of the
few countries in the world that admits immigrants [in significant
number], cannot provide relief from poverty or oppression [or even
persecution] to more than a tiny fraction of the world's rapidly growing
population. 453  Developing nations account for ninety percent of the
world's population growth.45 4 Large-scale migrations no longer provide
"a viable solution to economic and social problems., 455
The number of aliens seeking to immigrate to the United States is
unlimited, with the only practical restraints being the ability to physically
reach U.S. territory.456 The unlimited demand and increasing availability
of international travel have produced, and will continue to produce,
enormous and growing numbers of inadmissible aliens.4 7 Looking just at
appeals of denial of asylum, the largest category of relief cases, Professor
Martin noted years ago that "[t]here are millions of people around the
world, however, who face no substantial threat of persecution but who
would value such a chance at permanent residence in a stable and
wealthy nation., 45 s Affluent Western nations are like "61ite universities,
besieged by applicants., 459 The penalties for an inadmissible alien to lie
so as to qualify for relief from removal are slight and insignificant
compared to the potential benefits of such lawless action. Thus, the
incentive to try the U.S. immigration system is great.
the court has the jurisdiction to review the denial of a motion for continuance leading to
removal because it is discretionary), with Hamdan v. Gonzales, 425 F.3d 1051, 1060-61
(7th Cir. 2005) (finding no due process violation since discretionary decision was
involved).
452. See Martin, supra note 1, at 1267-70.
453. Brief for Federation for American Immigration Reform as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 6, Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1992) (No.
92-344) [hereinafter Brief for FAIR].
454. Id.; see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, GLOBAL POPULATION GROWTH: 2002, 12-13
(2002).
455. Brief for FAIR, supra note 453, at 7.
456. See Martin, supra note 1, at 1268.
457. See id. at 1268-69.
458. Id. at 1268.
459. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND
EQUALITY 32 (1983).
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B. Relief as a Form of Amnesty
There is little conceptual difference between an appellate system,
wherein petitioners are to be given the benefit of the doubt, and an
amnesty system where periodic amnesties are considered a desirable and
efficient means of overcoming the dysfunctionality of the law of reliefS460
from expulsion.
The substantive grounds for relief draw some non-citizens from those
who might otherwise participate in expulsion proceedings, and "act as
release valves through which cases may exit., 461  Professor Martin
underscored
the singular trumping power of a successful asylum claim. Such
a claim overcomes virtually all the other qualifying
requirements for immigration to the United States. It also
moves the applicant to the head of the line for early
permanent residence rights, even if [the alien] first established
his presence in the territory in knowing violation of the regular
provisions of the immigration laws.462
Other important forms of relief are registry and legalization or
"amnesty., 463  "Some of these grounds, such as the mass legalization
program enacted in 1986, have had massive, if temporary, impacts on
460. See Martin, supra note 1, at 1267-68 (observing that "[tihose who have been
victimized by persecution should indeed receive, early on, a secure new status that will
allow them to rebuild a new life in a new homeland, without undue insistence on the
bureaucratic niceties of ordinary immigration law. [However, there are] those who learn
about the power of a claim to refugee status [and] might choose to try their luck with an
asylum application.").
461. Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin, supra note 2, at 11.
462. Martin, supra note 1, at 1267-68.
463. See IRCA, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 201, 100 Stat. 3359, 3394-3404 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). The 1986 legalization program under INA
section 245A and the amnesty program under INA section 210 created a window during
which illegal aliens could apply for lawful status. See U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services, This Month in Immigration History: May 1987, http://www.uscis.gov/graphics/
aboutus/history/may1987.htm. Eligibility for legalization was based, with variations, on
entry before 1982 and continuously unlawful residence thereafter; eligibility for Special
Agricultural Worker (SAW) amnesty required U.S. residence and performance of
seasonal agricultural services between May 1985 and May 1986. Id. During the IRCA
application window in 1987-88, almost 2.7 million illegal aliens adjusted status to
temporary legal resident status. See JoAnne D. Spotts, U.S. Immigration Policy on the
Southwest Border from Reagan Through Clinton, 1981-2001, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 601,
610 (2002). Legalization applicants were then required to apply for legal permanent
resident status within forty-three months after obtaining temporary status. 8 C.F.R. §
245a.3(b)(1) (2006). SAW applicants were automatically adjusted to legal permanent
resident status in December 1989 or 1990. Cf. Applicant Processing for the Legalization
Program, 56 Fed. Reg. 482, 482-83 (Jan. 7, 1991) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 264).
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reducing the number of cases in the system. ''464 But over time, these
grounds have helped cause new and ever larger backlogs in the appeals
system. So long as global demand for immigration benefits remains
massive and unquenchable, relief from expulsion through group
legalization provisions will always push the administrative and judicial
review systems over the edge.
C. The Problem of Accuracy
Critics of EOIR have described it scathingly as a safe haven for
scofflaws, where unnecessary formalism "literally makes a federal case
out of every single illegal alien on our shores," crippling the detention
466
and removal system.
But a more significant critique, in my view, is that neither EOIR nor
appellate court decisions have proven to be accurate or efficient
predictors of future impermissible persecution or hardship for aliens who
467have been expelled from the United States. This constitutes a
fundamental problem of accuracy. Immigrant advocates make the claim
that the current appellate review system plays a critical function of
actually saving lives and improving human rights globally, and that this
humanitarian mission outweighs whatever deterrent effect that a more
rigorous expulsion review system might provide .
No reasonable person would suggest that since 1980, persecution and
hardship have continued to be tragic common features of life in many
areas of the world. Nonetheless, for the generation since the enactment
of asylum relief in 1980, authoritative studies documenting subsequent
persecution of persons expelled from the United States after their
applications for relief were denied simply do not exist in the legal
literature. There have been no "voyage[s] of the damned" from
American soil. 469 Even claims of mere harassment of persons denied
464. Palmer, Yale-Loehr & Cronin, supra note 2, at 12.
465. Cf id. at 22-23.
466. Juan Mann, Abolish the EOIR! Juan Mann's Absolutely Definitive Essay,
VDARE.COM, Dec. 6, 2005, http://www.vdare.com/mann/051206_essay.htm.
467. See Martin, supra note 1, at 1285.
468. Cf Tibetan Nun Detained in Virginia Jail Denied Parole Again, ASYLUM
PROTECTION NEWS 22 (Human Rights First, New York, N.Y.), Jan. 30, 2004,
http:/lwww.humanrightsfirst.org/asylumltorchlight/newsletternewslet_22.htm
(recommending that DHS "[g]ive asylum seekers the chance to appeal parole denials to
immigration judges").
469. On the other hand, commentators have noted that lengthy delays in the expulsion
of criminal aliens, particularly in the case of Mexican and Central American nationals,
have created significant transnational crime problems for the receiving countries. Mary
Helen Johnson, National Policies and the Rise of Transnational Gangs, MIGRATION INFO.
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nonrefoulement have been weak. A good example is provided by a 1993
Human Rights Watch report on Haiti:
The best-documented story of persecution of returnees is the case
of 154 people who were arrested by Haitian police on August
14, shortly after being repatriated by the U.S. Coast Guard. An
Associated Press report said the "roundup took place minutes
after the U.S. cutter Confidence dropped off the Haitians at a
Port-au-Prince dock." According to the Haitian police, the
repatriates were questioned about the reported hijacking of the
boat in which they had been attempting to flee. Police the next
day said that all but six had been released. An August 25 report
noted that one was still in police custody.
The measurable advancement of transformational justice overseas
should be a prominent objective of further reform of the law of relief
from expulsion. The BIA and the Article III courts will function more
effectively if they recognize that, other factors being equal, tougher or
speedier review of alien petitions for relief does not increase the actual
incidence of death, imprisonment, or torture of unsuccessful alien
applicants. If advocates for the persecuted were serious about using U.S.
immigration law to deter overseas persecution, rather than to expand
asylum as a route to permanent immigration, two immediate tools are
available: a carrot and a stick.
The "carrot" would be expanded refoulement services provided
through the United States Department of State or the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Aliens removed after
unsuccessful asylum or COR claims could be registered and tracked in
their home countries, in order to publicly monitor their safety, ensure
their protection during a transitional period, and improve the accuracy
and relevance of country condition reports. Similarly, relatives of United
States citizens who were the subject of hardship-related removals could
be provided specialized consular and contracted adjustment services
overseas on a very economic basis.
The "stick" would be a greatly expanded use of the INA section 243(d)
model of denial of visa privileges to a class of foreign nationals
implicated in persecution. 47' The federal government could implement a
SOURCE (Migration Policy Inst., Wash., D.C.), Apr. 1, 2006, http://www.migration
information.org/feature/display.cfm?id=394.
470. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HAITI: HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS (1993),
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993[WR93/Amw-07.htm (emphasis added).
471. INA § 243(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(d) (2000). The statute pertains to discontinuing
granting visas to nationals:
On being notified by the Attorney General that the government of a foreign
country denies or unreasonably delays accepting an alien who is a citizen,
subject, national, or resident of that country after the Attorney General asks
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routine practice of denial of travel and immigration benefits (possibly in
cooperation with other nations) to foreign officials, agencies, and classes
of related private parties who actually fail to provide protection or abet
472persecution.
VIII. PHYSICAL FRONTIERS AND VIRTUAL LEGAL BORDERS:
SPECULATION ON FUTURE TRENDS
"'The public will not allow governments to be generous if it believes
they have lost control.'
4 7 3
The long-term operation of a body of law that fails to perform its key
adjudicative role presents a profound crisis of justice to both the
responsible administrative agencies, as well as the judicial system 74 In
alien claims for relief from expulsion, a body of eccentric substantive law
is applied, many times without employing evidentiary standards.4 75 This
results in profound consequences not only for the applicants, but for the
far larger numbers of citizens who have no right or role whatsoever
beyond the ballot box in the operation or direction of the adjudicative
system.
While it is reasonable to conclude that the EOIR case-management
reforms have been implemented efficiently, no serious observer believes
that the reforms will satisfactorily resolve the jurisdictional struggles
between the agency and the courts.476 Moreover, the limited physical
capacity of the existing expulsion review system strongly implies that any
whether the government will accept the alien under this section, the Secretary of
State shall order consular officers in that foreign country to discontinue granting
immigrant visas or non-immigrant visas, or both, to citizens, subjects, nationals,
and residents of that country until the Attorney General notifies the Secretary
that the country has accepted the alien.
Id.
472. In October 2001, the Secretary of State exercised INA section 243(d) authority to
suspend the issuance of "all nonimmigrant visas to nationals of Guyana who are
employees of the Government of Guyana or of any of the companies owned in whole or in
substantial part by the Government of Guyana." U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUBL'N No.
179574, SUSPENSION OF ISSUANCE OF NONIMMIGRANT VISAS IN GUYANA (Oct. 2001),
available at http://www.immigration.com/newsletterlguyana.html. The suspension also
applied to spouses and children, both minor and adult, of the individuals. Id. The action
was described as a "targeted imposition of visa sanctions under section 243(d) that focuses
on those persons most likely to pressure Guyana's policy makers." Id.; cf Rachel Canty,
The New World of Custody Determinations After Zadvydas v. Davis, 18 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 467, 469 (2004).
473. Martin, supra note 1, at 1269-70 (quoting W. SMYSER, REFUGEES: EXTENDED
EXILE 2 (1987).
474. See id. at 1269-72.
475. Cf id. at 1269, 1271-72.
476. See, e.g., id. at 1272; Seipp & Feal, supra note 9, at 2005-06.
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attempt by the government to formally expel a significant number of
deportable aliens at one time would cause the system to implode.
The most likely legislative outcome will be a continuation of the trends
in streamlining and jurisdiction-stripping occurring over the past decade.
Deep and growing political divisions in the nation may prevent Congress
from acting on immigration reform. But those divisions are much less
significant when it comes to national security. Fears of terrorism have
led Congress to create a "virtual legal border wall" for aliens deemed
terrorists and security threats that begins well beyond our weak and
permeable geographic frontiers. 8
The legal border wall concept derives from the 1996 reforms, where
inadmissibility replaced entry.479 Aliens who are apprehended
outside the legal wall have extremely limited due process rights, and
therefore can be diverted before ever entering EOIR and the court
system.48" There is every reason to believe that Congress will seek to
expand the virtual border wall statutes to include the ever-increasing
number of alien applicants for admission of all types. With
continued sympathy in Congress, there has already been slow but
steady progress towards promulgating bars to relief and review based
on virtual legal borders, rather than physical frontiers. One tool
already available is administrative expansion of INA section
235(b)(1)(A)(iii) "expedited removal" to its broadest scope."'
477. Cf Operations of the Executive Office for Immigration Review: Hearing Before the
H. Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims, 107th Cong. 33-43 (2002) (statement of Michael
J. Heilman, Former Member, Board of Immigration Appeals) (describing the BIA's
expulsion review process).
478. See, e.g., INA § 212(a)(6)(C), (G), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C), (G) (2000), amended
by Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, 8
U.S.C.A. § 1182(a) (West Supp. 2006).
479. INA § 101(a)(13)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (2000), amended by Violence
Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, 8 U.S.C.A. §
1101(a) (West Supp. 2006) (defining admission as "the lawful entry of the alien into the
United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer"); 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (deeming persons who have not been lawfully admitted and who entered
without inspection to be inadmissible as if they were detained at the border).
480. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) ("It is well established that
certain constitutional protection available to persons inside the United States are
unavailable to aliens outside of our geographic borders.").
481. Cf, e.g., Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471,482-
84 (1999) (allowing the Attorney General to have discretion in executing removal and
other deportation processes).
482. Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,877, 48,878 (Aug. 11,
2004).
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Legislative additions of "zipper clause"-type language to narrowly
restrict habeas corpus review, for example a revision of NA section
242(g) to overturn Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee would be a natural complement to this approach. 483 The
increasing availability of electronic tracking of alien entries and exits
through the US VISIT system will increase the utility of such
summary removal procedures.
The congressional approach will most likely continue to be
fragmentary, rather than comprehensive, and it is likely to consist
primarily of new procedural restrictions that will provoke additional
administrative and judicial appeals that, in turn, magnified by unrelenting
demand, will continue to generate new backlogs. But Congress is not
likely to become overly concerned, because agency demands for
bureaucratic relief through streamlining will always succeed in political
struggles over competing alien demands for statutorily expanded due
process.
Speed-based solutions will reflect the reality that, without fast
adjudication at all stages of review, pressure from applicants with
marginal or fraudulent claims will inevitably threaten the system with
collapse.9 Expedited implementation of integrated electronic case filing
and management techniques at both the agency and judicial levels is
already occurring. Moreover, Congress will always be under pressure
to hire more US attorneys and IJs.
Judicial resource rationing will be a second type of congressional
reform that is likely to occur through fragmentary legislative actions.
Judicial resource rationing would include a combination of techniques to
discourage appeals in general, including the application of the case-
management reform techniques adopted by BIA.
I would expect to see a continued gradual tightening of filing deadlines
and other jurisdictional limits. Also, measures to keep more applicants
for relief in detention, or under electronic monitoring, will most likely
483. The REAL ID Act of 2005, P.L. No. 109-13 § 106(b) 119 Stat. 305 (May 11, 2005), used
this approach to amend ]NA §242(b)(9) (Consolidation of issues for judicial review) by adding a
new "zipper clause" at the end:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, no court shall have jurisdiction, by habeas
corpus under section 2241 of title 28, United States Code, or any other habeas corpus
provision, by section 1361 or 1651 of such title, or by any other provision of law
(statutory or nonstatutory), to review such an order or such questions of law or fact.
Id.
484. See Martin, supra note ], at 1322-26, 1367-69.
485. See, e.g., EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGR. REVIEW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
FISCAL YEARS 2005-2010 STRATEGIC PLAN 2, 5, 6, 8 (2004) (indicating a desire to make
as many procedures electronic as possible).
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occur as Congress percieves an increasing threat from terrorism-
especially as this perception will make concerns over any impact on
appeals backlogs a much lower political priority.
Further congressional tinkering with jurisdiction-stripping provisions
to limit appeal court review of IJ and BIA denials of relief, following the
direction of the REAL ID Act, are possible, given the deliberate
obscurity that characterizes the legislative history of previous "reforms."
In 1990, Professor Martin recommended the elimination of judicial
review except in the form of a certiorari-like "leave to appeal. 486 That
approach deserves renewed consideration.
The streamlined review process [established by the BIA] ... is
different from the "leave to appeal" and certiorari systems that
some appellate courts and administrative tribunals use to
control their dockets. These [alternate] systems often look to a
variety of factors apart from whether the decision for which
appellate review is sought reached a correct result.
If the scheme worked as envisioned by Martin, all denied claimants
would have access to an Article III judge. Judicial review of asylum
appeals would be discretionary, with important exemptions for
withholding of removal and Convention Against Torture (CAT) cases
that raise factual claims of actual harm to the alien's life or liberty. A
reform of this kind would promote a more skeptical approach to
petitions for review by the court, while preserving the agency incentives
for self-policing that are implicit in the REAL ID Act language.
490
Unfortunately, there is no constituency for this kind of comprehensive
486. See Martin, supra note 1, at 1356-57, 1364. Martin based his proposal on
Canadian legislation that established a new asylum adjudication system which eliminated
any centralized administrative review by a body equivalent to our BIA. Id. at 1335 (citing
Immigration Act, 1976, R.S.C., ch. 35 §§ 46, 48.02, 69, 71.1, amended by 1992 S.C., ch.46
(Can.)). The legislation also disallowed judicial review of denied refugee claims unless the
applicant first obtained "leave to appeal" from a specified court. Id. at 1363 (citing §§
83.1-85.1). Martin noted that the nearest United States analogue was the certiorari
process in the Supreme Court. See id.
487. Martin, supra note 1, at 1364 (noting that appeal would occur only when there
was "a substantial likelihood of reversal of the administrative action").
488. Streamlining, supra note 27, at 56,137-38.
489. Martin, supra note 1, at 1363.
490. See id. at 1363. See generally REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat.
302 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 49 U.S.C.). Professor Martin states:
The officials involved in adjudication would know that in some cases (exactly
which ones cannot be known in advance) the independent judicial branch will be
reviewing their work. But the initial access to the courts would be of a strictly
limited character. Within perhaps forty-five days, judicial review in a large
majority of cases would be at an end, and the underlying deportation or
exclusion order would become fully enforceable.
Martin, supra note 1, at 1365.
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approach in the immigration bar or any of the other institutional
stakeholders.
A political direction the current Congress would be more likely to take
is the consolidation of appellate review of denial of relief from expulsion
claims to a single federal appellate court, with the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit being the most likely candidate.
491
Geographic restriction will be less vulnerable to challenge on due process
grounds and will not be opposed by the majority of federal judges who
are unhappy with the pressures that the surge in immigration appeals has
placed on their dockets. The public perception that consolidation of
appeals in the District of Columbia Circuit will bring improved
consistency and predictability to expulsion proceedings-whether
apparent or real-will have a strong political attraction to lawmakers as
well.
491. Bob Egelko, Plan to Unify Immigrant Appeals, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 13, 2006,
available at http://www.shns.com/shns/g-index2.cfm?action=detail&pk=IMMIGRATION-
03-13-06.
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